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AFTER GONZALES V. RAICH: 
IS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE? 
BRADFORD C. MANK* 
In both its 1995 decision United States v. Lopez and in its 
2000 decision United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court 
had adopted a narrow economic interpretation of congres-
sional authority to regulate intrastate activities under the 
Commerce Clause. In four separate cases, three circuit courts 
(the District of Columbia, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits) strug-
gled with deciding whether Congress may still protect en-
dangered and threatened species that have little commercial 
value under the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison. 
In each case, the court concluded that Congress did have the 
authority to protect endangered species under the Commerce 
Clause, including small isolated intrastate species, although 
there were dissenting opinions in each case. Because Lopez 
and Morrison failed to provide an adequate framework for 
analyzing Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, 
the four decisions applied different and sometimes clearly 
contradictory rationales to justify regulation of endangered 
species under the Commerce Clause. 
In 2005, however, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich limited 
the scope of Lopez and Morrison by allowing Congress 
greater latitude to regulate intrastate activities under the 
Commerce Clause if they are regulated as part of a compre-
hensive statutory scheme that on the whole appropriately 
regulates interstate commerce. By emphasizing the author-
ity of Congress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities 
as part of a comprehensive scheme of regulation, both the 
Raich majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion-with its emphasis on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause-support the view that Congress has authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate all endangered species, in-
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of 
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eluding intrastate species or those with no direct commercial 
value in interstate commerce, because the ESA's comprehen-
sive scheme is necessary to preserve interdependent species 
and ecosystems that do have significant impacts on inter-
state commerce. Furthermore, because the statute regulates 
only endangered and threatened species, leaves all other spe-
cies to state regulation, and promotes concurrent federal-
state regulation of wildlife, the ESA's regulation of endan-
gered species is cabined by the type of limiting principles 
that Justice Scalia applied in his Raich concurrence, and, 
therefore, the ESA is consistent with the Constitution's fed-
eralist values. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its 1995 decision United States v. Lopez! and again in its 
2000 decision United States v. Morrison,2 the Supreme Court 
adopted a narrow, economic interpretation of congressional au-
thority to regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce 
Clause.3 In response, a series of commentators wrote articles 
addressing whether the two decisions' narrow, economic inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause raised doubts about Con-
gress's authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)4 to 
regulate either purely intrastate species or those with insignifi-
cant commercial value.5 Concerns about the constitutionality 
1. 514 U.s. 549 (1995). 
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
3. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [tlo 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra notes 84-90, 111-12 and 
accompanying text. 
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2004). 
5. See, e.g., Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: 
Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413 
(Apr. 2001) (stating that Lopez raises serious questions about whether Congress 
has the authority to regulate endangered species that lack significant commercial 
value); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the En-
dangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the 
Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735-36 (2002) (arguing 
that Lopez and Morrison raise serious constitutional concerns about Congress's 
authority to regulate endangered species with little economic value, especially 
species limited to one state); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets 
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998) (same); Eric 
Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Pro-
tection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 874, 883 (2001) (same); Omar N. 
White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis 
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of the ESA were heightened after the Court's 2001 decision in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U. S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (8WANCC),6 a case in which the Army 
Corps of Engineers (Corps) had claimed jurisdiction under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) to regulate iso-
lated, intrastate seasonal ponds that provided habitats for mi-
gratory birds.? The Court avoided the constitutional issue by 
narrowly interpreting the statute to exclude isolated waters 
and concluding that Congress intended the statute to apply 
only to navigable waters.8 In dicta, however, the Court sug-
gested that if Congress had sought to regulate non-navigable, 
intrastate waters in the statute, then such regulation might 
exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause because such 
intrastate land use regulation is a traditional area of local gov-
ernment contro1.9 In conjunction with Lopez and Morrison, the 
Court in SWANCC suggested an interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause that might threaten the constitutionality of the 
ESA, which protects species that live in only one state as well 
as those with little commercial value.l° 
In four separate cases, three federal courts of appeals have 
struggled with deciding whether Congress may still protect en-
Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 
(2000) (same). 
6. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
7. See id. at 162--B4; 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky 
Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811 (2003) (dis-
cussing SWANCC's implication that Congress may not regulate isolated wetlands 
under the Commerce Clause). 
8. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-74; Mank, supra note 7. 
9. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 
513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally per-
formed by local governments."»; Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intra-
state Endangered Species Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits 
over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private Commercial Development or the 
Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 929, 959 (2004). In its 2006 
decision Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court again focused on the statu-
tory meaning of the Clean Water Act and did not reach the scope of Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to regulate non-navigable waters. 126 S. Ct. 
2208 (2006). In dicta, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion cited Raich for the 
principle that Congress may regulate some intrastate activities as part of a com-
prehensive statutory scheme. Id. at 2250 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judg-
ment). 
10. See Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads, 
Wolves, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision, 
34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327 (2004) ("Many, perhaps most, listed species have no com-
mercial, recreational, or medicinal value and exist only in one state."); Mank, su-
pra note 5, at 769-73 (same); infra notes 145, 255-59, 262 and accompanying text. 
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dangered and threatened speCIes under the Commerce 
Clause. I I In each case, the court concluded that Congress had 
the authority to protect endangered species under the Com-
merce Clause, including small isolated intrastate species that 
have little commercial value, although there were dissenting 
opinions in each case. Due to Lopez's and Morrison's failure to 
provide an adequate framework for analyzing Congress's au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, the four decisions applied 
different and, sometimes, clearly contradictory rationales to 
justify regulation of endangered species. 12 Two of the circuit 
courts aggregated all endangered and threatened species in de-
termining that such species have a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce and in concluding that the ESA is constitu-
tional, but the Supreme Court has never validated that 
approach. 13 
In 2005, the Supreme Court limited the scope of Lopez and 
Morrison in Gonzales v. Raich l4 by allowing Congress greater 
latitude to regulate intrastate activities if those activities are 
regulated as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that on 
the whole appropriately regulates interstate commerce; the Lo-
II. See GDF Realty Inv. v. Norton (GDF) , 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g 
denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); 
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 334 
F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 
2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 326-45 (discussing four cases 
addressing constitutionality of Endangered Species Act); Mank, supra note 9, pas-
sim (same). 
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra notes 13, 145, 258-59, 
340-46,381-85 and accompanying text. 
13. See GDF, 326 F.3d at 638-41 (stating that it did not directly aggregate 
the taking of the Cave Species with takings of other endangered species to find a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but concluding that, because the taking 
of all Cave Species is part of a larger economic regulation scheme of the ESA, the 
takings could be aggregated with other takings of endangered and threatened 
species to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 
1046 ("[Courts] may look not only to the effect of the extinction of the individual 
endangered species at issue in this case, but also to the aggregate effect of the ex-
tinction of all similarly situated endangered species."). 
14. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a 
Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005); Michael 
Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Gonzalez v. Raich, the "Comprehensive Scheme" 
Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTL. L. 
491, 494-98 (2005) (discussing Raich's use of the comprehensive scheme principle 
and arguing Raich increases the probability that the Supreme Court will find the 
Endangered Species Act constitutional). 
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pez and Morrison decisions had not addressed this issue. ls In 
Raich, the Court held that the federal Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA)16 did not exceed Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause because the power to prohibit the intrastate 
cultivation and .use of marijuana in compliance with California 
law was rationally related to the regulation of interstate com-
merce in marijuana. Justice Stevens's majority opinion stated 
that even the Lopez decision had recognized the ability of Con-
gress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if their 
regulation was necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate 
commerce. 17 Because of the likelihood that some medical mari-
juana would be diverted to interstate recreational drug use, the 
Court concluded that the CSA could prohibit intrastate, non-
commercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal 
medical purposes. 18 
Not joining the majority opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia 
wrote an interesting and potentially influential concurring 
opinion that relied on the Constitution's Necessary and Proper 
Clause to justify regulation of medical marijuana under the 
Commerce Clause. 19 His emphasis on the role of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause could be especially helpful in defending 
Congress's authority to enact comprehensive statutes to regu-
late intrastate environmental harms that do not directly affect 
interstate commerce, but indirectly affect the environment in 
15. See infra notes 158, 167 and accompanying text. 
16. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
801-971 (2000». The CSA makes it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, 
or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203. 
17. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in 
Raich, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer had dissented in both Lopez and Morrison. 
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Lopez. See infra notes 101-05, 
178--79 and accompanying text. 
18. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12; infra notes 173-76 and accompanying 
text. 
19. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215--20 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14, 
at 766-68 (discussing and criticizing Justice Scalia's concurrence in Raich); Randy 
E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=880112 (same) (This paper was presented as the 2006 William Howard Taft 
Lecture at the University of Cincinnati School of Law); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and 
Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 791, 814-15 (2005) (same). 
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ways that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate com-
merce.20 
Both the Raich majority and Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion, with its emphasis on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, offer a way around many of the difficulties resulting 
from the failure of Lopez and Morrison to define the line be-
tween economic and non-economic activities under the Com-
merce Clause.21 By emphasizing the authority of Congress to 
regulate non-economic, intrastate activities as part of a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation, Raich's reasoning implies 
that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate endangered species.22 In conjunction with the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, Congress may protect all endangered 
species, including intrastate species or those with no direct 
commercial value in interstate commerce, because the ESA's 
comprehensive scheme is necessary to preserve interdependent 
species and ecosystems that do have significant impacts on in-
terstate commerce. Furthermore, because the statute regu-
lates only endangered and threatened species, leaves all other 
species to state regulation, and promotes concurrent federal-
state regulation of wildlife, the ESA's regulation of interstate 
20. See infra notes 311-12, 395-96, 411, 427 and accompanying text. 
21. See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federal· 
ism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1199, 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-{)0 (2003) (arguing Lopez and Morrison fail 
to clarify which types of commercial activities are within the scope of the Com-
merce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide the scope of the com-
merce power); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause 
Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1276-87 (2003) (discussing difficul-
ties lower courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic 
activities); infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
22. See Adler, supra note 14, at 775-76 (suggesting that, after Raich, the Su-
preme Court is likely to uphold the constitutionality of the ESA as a comprehen-
sive scheme); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98. But see Supplemen-
tal Brief in Support of Certiorari 1-9, GDF Realty Investments v. Norton, 545 
U.S. 1114 (2005) (No. 03-1619), available at http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/ 
propertyrights/cases/GDF _Supp_Br.pdf (arguing Cave Species and endangered 
species in general are not fungible commodities, distinguishing Raich from facts 
in GDF and contending that the ESA is unconstitutional and Supreme Court 
should grant certiorari); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword, Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARKL. REV. 743,747 (2005) (Professor Barnett argued the Raich case on behalf 
of the respondents) (''Raich could be construed simply as having adopted a limited 
'fungible goods' rationale for why it is essential to the larger prohibition of a na-
tional market in a commodity that even the local cultivation and possession of 
such a commodity also be reached."); infra notes 255, 311-'-12, 374-75, 395-96, 
411-13, 417, 419-20 and accompanying text. 
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commerce is cabined by the type of limiting principles that Jus-
tice Scalia applied in his Raich concurrence and is therefore 
consistent with federalism.23 
II. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
To understand Raich, it is essential to discuss the history 
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 
Between 1937 and 1995, the Court developed a broad approach 
to interpreting the Clause that allowed Congress to regulate 
some intrastate activities if they were an essential part of a 
comprehensive national regulatory scheme. Beginning in 1995, 
the Court began to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of 
the Clause, but as Raich explained, the Court did not foreclose 
the use of the comprehensive statutory scheme rationale for 
federal regulation of some wholly intrastate, noncommercial 
activities. The comprehensive scheme rationale for the regula-
tion of certain wholly intrastate, noncommercial activities is 
the key to justifying the ESA's regulation of all threatened and 
endangered species no matter how isolated or economically in-
significant. 
A. Commerce Clause Cases Before 1937 
Before 1937, the Supreme Court often read the scope of the 
Commerce Clause narrowly to prohibit federal regulation of in-
trastate activities, but it also sometimes read the Clause more 
broadly to allow regulation of intrastate activities if such regu-
lation was necessary to effectuate certain congressional pur-
poses. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall 
have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."24 
Commentators have disagreed about whether the original in-
tent of the Commerce Clause was limited to only congressional 
regulation of interstate trade and transportation of goods or 
whether it contemplated broader regulation.25 
23. See infra notes 261-95 and accompanying text. 
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
25. Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001) (arguing original intent of Commerce 
Clause was to regulate only interstate trade and transportation of goods), with 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, Essay, A Critique of the Narrow Inter-
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In Gibbons v. Ogden,26 the Supreme Court offered mixed 
messages about the extent of Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities affecting in-
terstate commerce.27 Chief Justice Marshall stated that Con-
gress's commerce power "is complete in itself, may be exercised 
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution."28 The Court refused to 
limit the term "commerce" to "prescribing rules for the conduct 
of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, 
or of barter."29 However, the Court placed some limits on the 
scope of Congress's authority under the Clause by stating that 
it does not reach intrastate activities "which are completely 
within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and 
with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of 
executing some of the general powers of the government."30 
From the late nineteenth century until 1936, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the limiting language in Gibbons and usu-
ally interpreted the Commerce Clause narrowly to exclude in-
pretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 707-15 (2002) (arguing 
original understanding of text of Commerce Clause allows broad regulation of ac· 
tivities connected to interstate commerce). 
26. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
27. Id. at 186-98; Mank, supra note 5, at 735; Sophie Akins, Note, Congress' 
Property Clause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species, 28 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 167, 169-71 (2000) (arguing that Justice Marshall's Gibbons opinion 
implied that commerce power reaches intrastate activities affecting interstate 
commerce); see also Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether 
They Want It or Not':· The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Fed-
eral Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
926, 927-29 (2001) (arguing Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons adopted broad 
interpretation of commerce power). 
28. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196. 
29. Id. at 190; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1256-57. There is continuing judi-
cial and scholarly debate about whether Gibbons's broad interpretation of the 
word "commerce" reflects the original intent of the Constitution's framers. See 
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1256-57 n.18. Compare Barnett, supra note 25, at 104 
(arguing original intent of Commerce Clause was to regulate only interstate trade 
and transportation of goods), with Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 25, at 707-15 
(arguing original understanding of text of Commerce Clause allows broad regula-
tion of activities connected to interstate commerce). Justice Thomas's concurring 
opinion in Lopez argues that "at the time the original Constitution was ratified, 
'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for 
these purposes," and did not include anything more. United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195; Mank, supra note 5, at 736; Akins, supra note 27, 
at 170 ("The Court ... acknowledged that the states have the sole ability to regu-
late completely intrastate commerce."). 
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trastate product, mining, or manufacturing activities-even if a 
product later entered interstate commerce--on the grounds 
that the intrastate manufacturing only indirectly affected in-
terstate commerce.31 In some "public morals" cases, however, 
the Court did read the Clause expansively to allow, for in-
stance, congressional legislation regulating interstate move-
ment of state lottery tickets.32 Additionally, during the early 
twentieth century, the Court interpreted the Clause to author-
ize Congress to regulate a few intrastate activities if they were 
inextricably connected with interstate activities and had a di-
rect effect on interstate commerce.33 In 1935, the Court 
warned that it must limit Congress's authority to regulate in-
trastate activities under the Clause because otherwise "there 
[would] be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all 
practical purposes we [would] have a completely centralized 
government."34 
31. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (''Mining brings 
the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did not 
authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate 
commerce even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895) (holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman 
Act because sugar manufacturing was intrastate activity even if sugar later en-
tered interstate commerce, stating "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is 
not part of it."); Mank, supra note 5, at 736; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1259-60; 
David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: The 
Rehnquist Court's Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 
789, 796-97 (2005) (discussing E.G. Knight's direct versus indirect test for Com-
merce Clause); John T. Winemiller, The Endangered Species Act and the Impre-
cise Scope of the Substantial Effects Analysis, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 171 (2004). 
32. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the Lottery Case, the 
Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked [the] power to prohibit the in-
terstate movement of lottery tickets because it had power only to regulate, not to 
prohibit." (citation omitted». 
33. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) 
(explaining that Congress's authority to regulate extended to intrastate "opera-
tions in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traf-
fic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the 
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under 
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without moles-
tation or hindrance"); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 171. 
34. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935); 
Scopp, supra note 31, at 796-97; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 171. 
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B. Commerce Clause Cases from 1937 Until 1995 
From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court applied a very 
lenient rational basis standard for reviewing congressional leg-
islation under the Commerce Clause, and upheld in every case 
congressional regulation of intrastate activities even if the ac-
tivities had only indirect impacts on interstate commerce.35 
Most importantly, the Court developed the comprehensive 
scheme rationale to justify regulation of some intrastate activi-
ties. This rationale is the primary grounds for concluding that 
the ESA's regulation of many intrastate or commercially insig-
nificant species is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court 
recognized that Congress had authority to regulate intrastate 
activities if doing so was necessary to enforce a comprehensive 
national regulatory scheme. In 1937, in the revolutionary case 
of NLRB u. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 36 the Court rejected 
its prior doctrine that intrastate manufacturing activities were 
beyond the scope of the commerce power, even if a product later 
entered interstate commerce. In approving the constitutional-
ity of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act,37 which gave the 
National Labor Relations Board broad authority to regulate the 
employment relationship between employers and many work-
ers, including manufacturing industries,38 the Court concluded 
35. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604-09 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing numer· 
ous Court decisions from 1937 until 1995 approving congressional legislation un-
der Commerce Clause); see, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-82 (1981) (upholding Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977 regulating intrastate mining activities under Commerce 
Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246, 252-53 
(1964) (upholding civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations under Commerce Clause); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scru-
tiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481, 482-84, 503-12 (discussing Supreme Court's highly def-
erential rational basis review used in wide range of cases from 1937 until 1990s); 
Brignac, supra note 5, at 874 ("Mter the Court's decision in NLRB [v. Jones] in 
1937, the Commerce Clause was a virtual blank check that Congress could use to 
pass almost any legislation."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana 
Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880 
(2005) (stating that from 1937 until Lopez in 1995 the Supreme Court did not 
strike down a federal statute as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause); 
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1263 (same). 
36. 310 U.S. 1 (1937). 
37. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151-
169 (2000»; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 126l. 
38. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 22-49; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
606 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating Court's fmding in Jones & McLaughlin Steel 
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that intrastate activities that "have such a close and substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essen-
tial or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and 
obstructions" are within the scope of the Commerce Clause.39 
Because labor strife in a single factory could affect labor rela-
tions in out-of-state factories and, as a result, could substan-
tially affect national productivity in important national indus-
tries, the statute was valid.4o The Court, however, observed 
that federalism required some limits on Congress's authority to 
regulate intrastate activities.41 
In 1941, the Court in United States v. Darby approved 
Congress's regulation of certain intrastate activities closely re-
lated to interstate regulation of labor conditions under both the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.42 The 
Court held that Congress could use the commerce power to 
prohibit from interstate commerce all goods produced by em-
ployers who did not comply with wage and hour standards.43 
Furthermore, under the Necessary and Proper Clause alone, 
the Court held that Congress could require employers to keep 
employment records in order to demonstrate compliance with 
those standards because "the requirement for records even of 
has "since been seen as beginning the abandonment, for practical purposes, of the 
formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects"); Dral & Phillips, supra 
note 5, at 10,413 (same). 
39. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37; Mank, supra note 5, at 736-37; 
Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172. Compare Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 
36-39 (holding statute prohibiting unfair labor practices is within commerce 
power), with Carter, 298 U.S. at 310-11 (rejecting similar labor laws in Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding commerce power). 
40. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37-41; Scopp, supra note 31, at 797-
98. In Morrison, the Court described the Jones decision as having broadened con-
gressional "latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce 
Clause." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); Winemiller, supra 
note 31, at 172. 
41. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37. 
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of 
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to em-
brace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliter-
ate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create 
a completely centralized government. 
Id.; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172. 
42. 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). 
43. Id. at 113-21. 
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the intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to a legiti-
mate end."44 
In 1942, in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy,45 the Court 
used both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to sustain federal regulation of the intrastate produc-
tion and sale of milk because such regulation was essential to 
the federal regulation of interstate milk prices.46 First, the 
Court explained that Congress's power to regulate interstate 
commerce "extends to those intrastate activities which in a 
substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the 
granted power."47 The Court stated that the commerce power 
reached intrastate activities that substantially affected or ob-
structed interstate commerce even though the activities were 
wholly intrastate: "It is the effect upon interstate commerce or 
upon the exercise of the power to regulate it, not the source of 
the injury which is the criterion of congressional power."48 
Second, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court 
stated that Congress had the authority to enact legislation 
regulating intrastate activity as "necessary and appropriate to 
make the regulation of the interstate commerce effective."49 
In the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn,50 the Court first in-
terpreted the Commerce Clause to authorize Congress to use 
an "aggregation" principle to reach far smaller intrastate ac-
tivities than those in Jones & Laughlin Steel or even Wright-
wood Dairy.51 The Court held that Congress could prohibit 
farmers from growing wheat exclusively for home consumption 
because the aggregate impact of homegrown wheat used by 
thousands of farm families had a substantial effect on inter-
44. Id. at 121-24. 
45. 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). 
46. Id. at 118--21; Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (discussing Wrightwood Dairy and the Necessary and Proper Clause); 
J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619 (same); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172-73 (same). 
47. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173. 
48. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173. 
49. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121; see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing Wrightwood Dairy); Winemiller, supra note 31, 
at 173. As will be discussed in Part IV, infra, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion 
in Raich emphasized the above-quoted language in Wrightwood Dairy and similar 
cases that used the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify Commerce Clause 
regulation. 
50. 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942). 
51. See id. at 127-29; Scopp, supra note 31, at 798. 
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state commerce that was "far from trivial" by competing with 
commercially sold wheat in interstate commerce. 52 Although 
acknowledging that one farmer's intrastate activities did not 
have a "substantial" impact on interstate commerce, the 
Wickard Court concluded that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate such intrastate activities if there was a 
rational basis for Congress to believe that those intrastate ac-
tivities substantially affect interstate commerce when aggre-
gated "together with that of many others similarly situated."53 
A significant problem with the Wickard aggregation doctrine is 
that it is unclear which intrastate activities courts should ag-
gregate in determining whether the effect upon interstate 
commerce justifies legislation under the Commerce Clause. 54 
In two 1964 cases, the Court broadly aggregated intrastate 
activities to find substantial effects on interstate commerce 
that justified newly enacted civil rights legislation prohibiting 
racial discrimination in public accommodations, including 
those operated by private businesses. In Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel, Inc. v. United States,55 the Court held that Congress could 
prohibit racial discrimination by a motel that obtained seventy-
five percent of its guests from outside of Georgia and was next 
to two interstate highways. Despite objections that the ac-
commodations themselves did not move across state lines, the 
Court reasoned that racial discrimination practiced by the mo-
tel and similar motels or hotels in the aggregate harmed inter-
state commerce by discouraging travel by racial minorities. 
The Court refused to examine whether Congress's real motive 
was promoting civil rights rather than increasing interstate 
commerce and concluded that "Congress was not restricted" by 
the fact that it was "dealing with what it considered a moral 
problem."56 Heart of Atlanta Motel's recognition that Congress 
may regulate for moral reasons should defeat any attempt by 
52. 317 U.S. at 124-25 (holding Congress may regulate homegrown wheat 
under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (2000»; Mank, suo 
pra note 9, at 945. 
53. Mank, supra note 9, at 945. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist described 
Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause author· 
ity over intrastate activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; Mank, supra note 9, at 946. 
54. See Nagle, supra note 5, at 179-80 ("[W]hat Wickard does not answer is 
the level of generality that Congress is permitted to use when aggregating 'simi· 
lar' activities."). 
55. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
56. Id. at 257; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1263-64. 
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critics of the ESA to argue that it is invalid under the Com-
merce Clause because Congress probably had moral as well as 
economic motivations when it enacted the statute in 1973. 
In Katzenbach v. McClung,57 the Court upheld the applica-
tion of civil rights legislation to a barbecue restaurant that had 
some out-of-state customers and purchased forty-six percent of 
its meat from an out-of-state supplier. The Court concluded 
that discrimination by the restaurant and similar establish-
ments in the aggregate harmed interstate travel by discourag-
ing travel by racial minorities.58 It stated that Congress could 
consider the "total incidence" of the practice of discriminatory 
accommodations on commerce rather than merely the impact of 
individual restaurants. 59 The Court stated that it would exam-
ine the impact of a "class" of activities rather than the impact 
of individual businesses or activity on commerce.60 Further-
more, the Court stated that it would apply a rational basis test 
in determining whether the class of activities had a significant 
impact on interstate commerce.61 The Katzenbach decision 
supports the ESA's aggregation of all threatened and endan-
gered species in determining their impact on the national econ-
omy and argues against considering the economic impact of 
each species separately. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, in two Commerce 
Clause cases, the Court provided further-but incomplete---
guidance on when federal legislation may regulate some intra-
state activities as part of a comprehensive scheme. First, in 
Maryland u. Wirtz,62 the Court held that the Commerce Clause 
authorized Congress to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
the states because federal regulation of workers in state 
schools and hospitals was necessary to effectuate federal regu-
lation of interstate competition among employers.63 The origi-
nal statute required employers to pay each employee who was 
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce a 
specified minimum wage, but the challenged amendment ex-
tended the law to include all employees working for enterprises 
57. 379 U.S. 294. 
58. [d. at 300-02. 
59. [d. at 301. 
60. [d. at 303. 
61. [d. at 303-04. 
62. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
63. [d. at 189-90; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173. 
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engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, 
even if an individual employee was not involved in such an ac-
tivity.64 The Court held that it was rational for Congress to 
weigh an employer's impacts on interstate commerce rather 
than on individual employee's impact.65 The Court refused "to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the application of la-
bor standards to an employer with a few employees who were 
not engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce, reason-
ing that the aggregate effect of excising all trivial instances 
would undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory program.66 
The Court, however, stressed that Congress could regulate in-
trastate activities with trivial impacts on commerce only if that 
regulation was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
bearing a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.67 
The Wirtz decision suggests that Congress may regulate some 
endangered species that have only trivial impacts on interstate 
commerce as long as the ESA is a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme bearing a substantial relationship to interstate com-
merce. 
Second, in its next Commerce Clause case, the Supreme 
Court provided a little more explanation of when a comprehen-
sive federal statute may reach intrastate activities that would 
by themselves not be subject to the Clause. In Perez v. United 
States, the Court in 1971 upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
erallaw against loan-sharking,68 despite the fact that the fed-
eral government was usurping traditional general police pow-
ers belonging to state governments.69 The Perez Court 
emphasized that Congress could regulate a class of activities 
that significantly affected interstate commerce even though the 
regulated class might include some intrastate activities that 
64. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 185-86; Alex Kreit, Why Is Congress Still Regulating 
Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 169, 195 (2004). 
65. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 190-97 (stating that when the Court finds that a "ra· 
tional basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme [is] necessary to the protection 
of commerce, our investigation is at an end"). 
66. Id. at 192-93 (conceding that ''labor conditions in businesses having only 
a few employees ... may not affect commerce very much or very often" but stating 
that, under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), courts do not ''have power to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of 
activities"); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173. 
67. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-97. 
68. Loan-sharking is the practice of loaning money at exorbitant interest 
rates, often with threats of violence or actual violence for failure to repay the loan. 
69. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 149-50, 154-57 (1971). 
390 UNIVERSITY OF COWRADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
might not affect interstate commerce.7o The Court observed 
that in Darby "a class of activities was held properly regulated 
by Congress without proof that the particular intrastate activ-
ity against which a sanction was laid had an effect on com-
merce."7) Quoting Wirtz, the Perez Court stated that "[w]here 
the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the 
reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as 
trivial, individual instances' of the class."72 Following Perez, 
there is a strong argument that Congress has authority under 
the Commerce Clause to categorize all threatened and endan-
gered species as a "class of activities" that significantly affect 
interstate commerce. 
In the related cases of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n,73 and Hodel v. Indiana,74 the Supreme 
Court more fully developed the comprehensive scheme ration-
ale for justifying the regulation of some intrastate activities.75 
In Hodel v. Indiana, the Court stated: 
A complex regulatory program ... can survive a Commerce 
Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet 
of the program is independently and directly related to a 
valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged 
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program 
and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole 
satisfies this test.76 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the "prime farm-
lands" provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977 (SMCRA), even though most of the harm to 
such farmlands from mining had intrastate rather than inter-
state impacts.77 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, the 
Court held the Act valid on the ground that the absence of fed-
erallegislation would likely lead to ruinous competition among 
states in lowering state environmental standards in order to 
70. Id. at 152-55. 
71. Id. at 152. 
72. Id. at 154 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193). 
73. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
74. 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
75. See Adrian Vermeule, Centralization and the Commerce Clause, 31 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 11,334, at 11,335 (Nov. 2001). 
76. 452 U.S. at 329 n.17. 
77. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 324; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 174. 
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retain or attract businesses from other statesJ8 The Court 
concluded that the "prime farmland" provisions were reasona-
bly necessary "to ensure that production of coal for interstate 
commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the envi-
ronment, or public health and safety, injury to any of which in-
terests would have deleterious effects on interstate com-
merce."79 It reasoned that Congress may enact legislation 
under the Commerce Clause to prevent states from engaging in 
a "race-to-the-bottom" to attract businesses because such com-
petition would probably result in inappropriate intrastate envi-
ronmental standards.8o The Court stated that it would apply a 
deferential rational basis standard of review in determining 
"whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid 
under the Commerce Clause" because the "Clause is a grant of 
plenary authority to Congress."81 
As will be discussed in Part V, the comprehensive scheme 
rationale in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and a series of 
Supreme Court cases beginning in 1937 is probably the strong-
est justification for concluding that the regulation of isolated, 
economically insignificant endangered species is constitutional 
because such regulation is part of the Endangered Species Act's 
comprehensive scheme for protecting all endangered species. 
Additionally, as will be discussed in Part V, Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining's conclusion that Congress may regulate intra-
state activities to prevent a race to the bottom among states 
that would eventually harm interstate commerce supports fed-
eral protection of endangered or threatened species to prevent 
states from under-protecting such species. Under the compre-
78. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-82; Mank, supra note 9, at 
947. 
79. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 327-29; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 174. 
80. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-82; accord Hodel v. Indiana, 
452 U.S. at 329; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 947-48 (discussing Hodel v. Vir· 
ginia Surface Mining and concept of states racing to bottom by lowering environ-
mental standards to attract business); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and 
Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. 
Q. 174 (2006) (presenting empirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom" 
among states regulating surface-mining); Sara D. Van Loh, Note, The Latest and 
Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho 
Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 483 (2004). 
81. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted) (empha-
sis added); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 795, 811 (1996) (discussing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining's use of 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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hensive scheme rationale that allows Congress to regulate 
purely intrastate activities if they are an integral part of a lar-
ger regulatory scheme and the Court's highly deferential ra-
tional basis standard of review in Commerce Clause cases, if 
the Supreme Court had addressed the constitutionality of the 
ESA sometime between its enactment in 1973 and 1995, the 
Court almost certainly would have concluded that Congress 
had authority under the Clause to enact the ESA even though 
some of the species the statute regulates exist in only one state 
or have little direct economic significance.82 
C. A Lopez Revolution? The Supreme Court Narrows the 
Commerce Power to Economic Activities 
In 1995, the Court in Lopez, with a surprising five-to-four 
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that a federal 
statute exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause.83 The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
(GFSZA) of 1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a 
gun within a school zone (defined as a 1,000-foot radius around 
any school), exceeded congressional commerce power because 
the activity was primarily non-economic, had little direct rela-
tionship to interstate commerce, and regulation of intrastate 
crime was largely a state or local function. 84 The Court stated 
that the possession of a gun in a school zone "has nothing to do 
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms."85 
The Lopez decision focused on Congress's authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate "those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce."86 Al-
though the Lopez Court used the same rational basis standard 
of review as in prior cases, it applied the substantial effects test 
82. See also Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80 (arguing that federal regulation of 
endangered species is consistent with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining's ration-
ale that federal government may regulate intrastate activities if there is a serious 
failure by state regulators to do so); Mank, supra note 9, at 923-24, 945 (same). 
83. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, 
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See also Mank, supra 
note 9, at 948-53. 
84. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 55~7; Mank, supra note 9, at 948. 
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61. 
86. Id. at 558-59; Mank, supra note 9, at 948. 
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more strictly than had any Court since 1936.87 The Lopez 
Court stated that Congress has authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate "economic activity" that substantially affects 
interstate commerce, but generally does not have power to 
regulate noncommercial activities that only indirectly affect in-
terstate commerce.88 
Rejecting prior interpretations of the Commerce Clause, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the Court would restrict 
Wickard's aggregation doctrine to economic activities because 
the Wickard decision itself had stated that Congress may regu-
late only activities that "exert[ ] a substantial economic effect 
on interstate commerce."89 The Court stated "[w]here economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained."90 The Court did ac-
knowledge that Congress may enact legislation regulating 
some intrastate activities that lack a substantial impact on in-
terstate commerce if the regulatory scheme is "an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate ac-
tivity were regulated."91 The Court concluded that the 
GFSZA's regulation of gun possession near schools did not meet 
the "substantially affects" test for interstate commerce because 
it was neither a commercial activity in itself nor an essential 
ingredient for a primarily interstate economic activity.92 Thus, 
the G FSZA went beyond the boundaries of the Commerce 
Clause.93 
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (applying rational basis standard of review); 
Mank, supra note 9, at 949. 
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63; see also William Funk, The Court, the Clean 
Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10,741, at 10,763 (July 2001); Scopp, supra note 31, at 800-02; Mank, su-
pra note 9, at 949. 
89. Lopez 514 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 125 (1942»; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 949; Schapiro & Buzbee, su-
pra note 21, at 1222 (arguing that Lopez interpreted Wickard too narrowly as al-
lowing aggregation of only economic activities). 
90. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 9, at 949-50. 
91. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 950; Vermeule, su-
pra note 75, at 11,335. 
92. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that the GFSZA is not "an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity"); see also Dral & Phillips, supra 
note 5, at 10,414; Mank, supra note 9, at 950. 
93. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; Mank, supra note 9, at 950. 
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The Lopez decision suggested that the Co~rt would more 
strictly review federal statutes under the Commerce Clause 
that infringed on subject areas traditionally regulated by state 
or local governments.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged 
that some of the Court's decisions, such as Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining, had implied that the Court would grant almost 
complete deference to Congress if there was "any rational ba-
sis" for a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects 
interstate commerce.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred 
in the judgment in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,96 rejected 
such broad deference because it would undermine the federalist 
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local."97 
The Court rejected Congress's "costs of crime" and "na-
tional productivity" rationales for the GFSZA because under 
these theories it is "difficult to perceive any limitation on fed-
eral power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or 
education where States historically have been sovereign."98 
The Court also noted that regulation of school grounds was 
within the "general police power" retained by the states and, 
thus, not an appropriate area for federal regulation unless 
Congress could show a valid economic relationship with inter-
state commerce.99 The Court concluded that GFSZA was un-
constitutional because otherwise the Court would be "hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is 
without power to regulate."100 
94. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3; see, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and 
the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 523, 543-47, 552-55, 563, 
590 (2003) (discussing and criticizing the Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to 
restrict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 
5, at 770-72; Mank, supra note 9, at 950-51; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 175-
77. 
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58,567-68; see Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Rec· 
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); see also Bilionis, supra note 35, at 509. 
96. See 452 U.S. at 311 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a par-
ticular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily 
make it so.") (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). 
97. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (citations omitted); Bilionis, supra note 35, at 
509. 
98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Mank, supra note 9, at 95l. 
99. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Mank, supra note 9, at 951; Winemiller, supra 
note 31, at 175-78. 
100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Bilionis, supra note 35, at 537-39. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Jus-
tice O'Connor, agreed with the majority's federalist approach to 
interpreting the Commerce Clause when he stated that the 
Court should strictly review congressional legislation that 
regulates an "area[ ] of traditional state concern" to which 
"States lay claim by right of history and expertise."lOl Other-
wise, "the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state 
authority would blur and political responsibility would become 
illusory."102 Nevertheless, he expressed reservations about the 
Court using its authority to strike down congressional legisla-
tion because courts must consider the differences between "the 
economic system the Founders knew" and "the single, national 
market still emergent in our own era."103 He also warned that 
the Court should not radically change its approach to Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, stating that "the Court as an in-
stitution and the legal system as a whole have an immense 
stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as 
it has evolved to this point."104 Justice Kennedy appeared to 
adopt a more flexible approach to the substantial effects test 
than the majority opinion when he implied that Congress could 
regulate noncommercial activities having a nexus to interstate 
commerce if the legislation did not intrude on areas within the 
traditional state police power. 105 
101. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14, 
at 756-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 951-52; White, 
supra note 5, at 238-39; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 176. 
102. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14, 
at 757; Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 951-52; White, su-
pra note 5, at 238-39; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 176. 
103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
104. Id. at 574; Adler, supra note 14, at 756. 
105. See also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 801-04 (1996) (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" 
concurrence in Lopez as more moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion); Bilionis, supra note 35, at 500-02, 549-51 (describing Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor as taking more deferential approach to statutory review than Chief 
Justice Rehnquist or Justices Scalia or Thomas, but observing it is uncertain to 
what extent they will allow congressional regulation of non-traditional intrastate 
activities); Stephen R. McAllister, Essay, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit 
to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 238-
42 (1996) (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to federalism as 
model for future cases). See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-81 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 352-53; David A. Linehan, En-
dangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable 
Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
365, 404-05 (1998); Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 952 
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice BreyerlO6 argued that the 
majority opinion was inconsistent with the Court's prior deci-
sions upholding statutes regulating activities that had much 
less impact on interstate commerce than the possession of a 
gun on school grounds. 107 He contended that the majority's 
distinction between "commercial" and "noncommercial" trans-
actions was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, which he 
maintained authorizes regulation of either type of activity as 
long as it significantly impacts interstate commerce.108 Addi-
tionally, he maintained that the distinction was unworkable 
because it was inherently impossible to make such delineations 
and would create ''legal uncertainty in an area of law that, un-
til this case, seemed reasonably well settled."109 
The Lopez decision did not clearly explain to what extent it 
sought to repudiate the Court's highly deferential approach in 
Commerce Clause cases between 1937 until 1995. As discussed 
in Parts III and IV, both the Raich majority opinion and Jus-
tice Scalia's concurring opinion argued that the Lopez decision 
acknowledged that Congress could regulate some intrastate, 
non-economic activities that are an "an essential part of a lar-
ger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated,"11O although Lopez did not clearly explain when 
Congress could do so. The Lopez decision's narrow economic fo-
cus raised questions about the constitutionality of the ESA's 
n.174; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 908; White, supra note 5, at 238-39. Arguably, 
even Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion implied that Congress might use 
the commerce power to regulate non·economic activities that do not intrude on 
traditional areas of state control. See Mank, supra note 9, at 952 n.174; Virelli & 
Leibowitz, supra note 27, at 954; see also Mank, supra note 5, at 741 n.106. 
106. He was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Dral & 
Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,414-15; Mank, supra note 9, at 952 n.175 (listing 
cases cited in Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent). 
108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra 
note 5, at 10,418-21; Mank, supra note 9, at 952. 
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28, 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord id. at 608 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lopez's commercial versus noncommercial dis-
tinction as unworkable); Mank, supra note 9, at 952; Scopp, supra note 31, at 
791-92, 802-13, 818-24 (discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in 
applying Lopez's distinction between economic from non-economic activities under 
the Commerce Clause); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1276-87 (same). 
110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Mank, supra note 9, at 
950; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335. 
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protection of species with little economic value, but the deci-
sion's acknowledgement of the comprehensive scheme rationale 
left open the possibility that the statute is constitutional. 
D. The Morrison Court's Respect for Traditional State 
Authority and Federalism 
In 2000, in Morrison, a five-to-four decision written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist that reflected the same division among 
justices as in Lopez, the Court applied Lopez's economic ap-
proach to the substantial effects test to invalidate the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA). The Court held that the VAWA, 
which provided a civil damages remedy for victims of gender-
based violence, exceeded the limits of the Commerce Clause be-
cause the activity was essentially non-economic and was only 
indirectly connected to interstate commerce. 1 1 1 Explaining Lo-
pez's substantial effects test, the Morrison Court emphasized 
that "in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation 
of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial ef-
fects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been 
some sort of economic endeavor."112 Although the Lopez Court 
had indicated that Congress's failure to make legislative find-
ings about the connection between guns at schools and inter-
state commerce was a factor in its decision, the Morrison Court 
struck down the VA WA even though Congress had made ex-
plicit findings in the statute regarding the economic impacts of 
gender-based violence on interstate commerce. The majority 
concluded that the causal connection between gender-based 
crimes and any economic consequences was too indirect and at-
tenuated to justify regulation under the Clause. 1 13 
Additionally, reflecting Lopez's federalist approach, the 
Morrison Court stated that it would examine the constitution-
ality of legislation under the Clause in light of protecting tradi-
tional state functions. 114 The Morrison Court stated that it 
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-19 (2000); Mank, supra note 
9, at 927-28, 954-55. 
112. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
113. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Mank, supra note 9, at 928,954. 
114. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 ("[W]e can think of no better example of the po· 
lice power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in 
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims."); 
Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563, 590 (discussing and criticizing 
Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the 
398 UNIVERSITY OF COWRADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
would usually reject legislation in which Congress had aggre-
gated primarily non-economic activities to demonstrate a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce because such a test could 
support federal usurpation of traditional state functions. 1 15 If 
the Court accepted a theory of substantial effects based on the 
aggregation of primarily non-economic activities, "petitioners' 
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long 
as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has sub-
stantial effects on employment, production, transit, or con-
sumption."116 
Furthermore, the Morrison Court asserted that federalist 
principles supported its decision because such aggregation 
could "completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction be-
tween national and local authority."117 As an example, the 
Court observed that the aggregation of non-economic activities 
could "be applied equally as well to family law and other areas 
of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of mar-
riage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is un-
doubtedly significant." I 18 The Court asserted that its prior de-
cisions had aggregated only economic activities in determining 
whether an activity had substantial impacts on interstate 
commerce.119 The Morrison decision, however, did not adopt a 
clear position that aggregating non-economic activities is al-
ways inappropriate, stating: "While we need not adopt a cate-
gorical rule against aggregating the effects of non-economic ac-
tivity in order to decide these cases, thus far ... our cases have 
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
where that activity is economic in nature."120 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that 
Wickard and its progeny demonstrated that "Congress has the 
power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate, 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."12I Despite 
the majority's contention that it was applying a rational basis 
Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at 770--72 (same). 
115. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615--17; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
116. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
118. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615--16; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
119. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610--11; Mank, supra note 9, at 954. 
120. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 9, at 954-
55. 
121. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra 
note 9, at 955. 
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standard and its "nominal adherence to the substantial effects 
test," Justice Souter contended that the majority was in fact 
using a more stringent, uncertain standard for determining 
whether activities in the aggregate substantially affect inter-
state commerce because the Court would have upheld the stat-
ute if it had heard the case between 1942 and 1995. 122 In light 
of congressional legislative findings in the VAWA and its legis-
lative history, he concluded that Congress had supplied ra-
tional evidence that gender-motivated violence significantly 
impacts interstate commerce and, therefore, the statute was 
constitutional. 123 
The Morrison decision raised uncertainties about when 
Congress may aggregate non-economic, intrastate activities as 
part of a national regulatory scheme. Additionally, the Morri-
son Court arguably departed from the traditional rational basis 
standard of review for a more stringent, but uncertain stan-
dard. As a result, Morrison raised questions about the consti-
tutionality of the ESA's protection of economically insignificant 
species, although it provided no clear answers. Nevertheless, 
as is discussed in Parts III and IV, both the Raich majority 
opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion observed that 
the Morrison decision acknowledged that Congress could regu-
late some intrastate, non-economic activities as part of a com-
prehensive national regulatory scheme that is primarily eco-
nomic in nature. Thus, neither Lopez nor Morrison foreclosed 
the possibility that the ESA's protection of species with little 
economic value is valid under the comprehensive scheme ra-
tionale. 
E. Analysis of the Lopez-Morrison Economic Approach to 
the Commerce Clause 
The Lopez and Morrison decisions made at least three sig-
nificant changes to the Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. First, both decisions emphasized that the Commerce 
Clause primarily concerns economic regulation and suggested 
that legislation regulating non-economic activities will receive 
122. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra 
note 9, at 955. 
123. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, 
at 955. 
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less deferential review from the Court.124 Second, both deci-
sions emphasized federalist principles as a basis for determin-
ing the appropriate level of scrutiny and implied that federal 
legislation intruding on traditional state areas of regulation 
will receive much less deference. 125 Third, Morrison explicitly 
limited Congress's authority to aggregate non-economic, intra-
state actions to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, except perhaps in unusual circumstances, both be-
cause the aggregation of non-economic activities could justify 
virtually any type of federal regulation and because the aggre-
gation of non-economic activities threatened federal usurpation 
of traditional state functions. 126 
A fundamental problem with both the Lopez and Morrison 
decisions is that they failed to provide a workable test for dis-
tinguishing between economic and non-economic activities for 
the purpose of determining which intrastate activities may be 
aggregated to meet the Commerce Clause's substantial effects 
124. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-17 (emphasizing that Commerce Clause 
primarily regulates economic activities); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
559--62 (1995) (same); Funk, supra note 88, at 10,763 (discussing emphasis in Lo-
pez and Morrison on economic basis of Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at 
737-38, 743 (same); Mank, supra note 9, at 957; supra notes 84-90, 111-12 and 
accompanying text. 
125. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67; Mank, supra 
note 9, at 955, 957; see also Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563, 
590 (discussing and criticizing Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at 770--72 
(same); supra notes 94, 97-102, 114-15, 117-18 and accompanying text. The 
Morrison Court suggested that the scope of the Commerce Clause should be lim-
ited to economic activities in part for federalist reasons because states have tradi-
tionally regulated many non-economic activities through education, criminal and 
family law; however, some commentators have argued that there has been more 
concurrent federal regulation of these areas than the Rehnquist Court acknowl-
edged. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-18 (suggesting federalism requires recognition 
of areas of exclusive state control over traditional areas of state and local control 
such as criminal and family law); supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
But see Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 812 (''The thesis of this Article is that, con-
trary to the usual view, the constitutional status of the principle of federalism 
does not necessarily depend on the existence of areas of exclusive state power."); 
Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55, 957 (arguing federal government has often exer-
cised concurrent authority over land use decisions and wildlife); see also 
Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563, 590 (criticizing Rehnquist 
Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause because federal government has played a role in many areas that Morrison 
and Lopez decisions treated as "traditional" areas of state control); Mank, supra 
note 5, at 770--72 (same); infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
126. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17; Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55; Pushaw, 
supra note 35, at 880--81, 894-95; supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
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test. 127 The two decisions strongly imply that courts should 
aggregate only economic activities, although the decisions leave 
open the possibility of rare exceptions where non-economic ac-
tivities might be aggregated. 128 Yet, the two cases provide no 
workable standard for distinguishing between economic and 
non-economic activities, or between commercial and noncom-
mercial activities, which are arguably narrower terms than the 
economic and non-economic distinction. 129 The Lopez decision 
itself acknowledged that "a determination whether an intra-
state activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some 
cases result in legal uncertainty."130 Any simple categorical 
test or exclusion such as a direct/indirect test or an eco-
nomic/non-economic test that is applied to a complex subject 
such as interstate commerce will inevitably fail to answer 
many difficult questions. 131 Chief Justice Rehnquist defended 
his approach by arguing that such uncertainty was an inherent 
problem in defining the boundaries of a limited constitutional 
127. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lopez com-
mercial versus noncommercial distinction as unworkable); accord id. at 608 
(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mank, supra note 9, at 928--29, 952 (arguing Lo-
pez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are within 
scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of 
commerce power); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1202, 1204--{)5, 1228, 
1258--60 (same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 791-92, 802-13, 818--24 (same); Sein-
feld, supra note 21, at 1276-87 (same and discussing difficulties lower courts have 
encountered in applying Lopez distinction between economic from non-economic 
activities under the Commerce Clause). 
128. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 nA ("[I]n every case where we have sus-
tained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard u. Filburn 
the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character." (citation omit-
ted»; Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55 (discussing Lopez's and Morrison's reasoning 
that Congress may not usually regulate non-economic activities under Commerce 
Clause); Scopp, supra note 31, at 802 (same); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1276-79 
(same); supra notes 90-91, 114-20 and accompanying text. 
129. Mank, supra note 9, at 928--29; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 880-81, 894-95 
(arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities 
are within scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to de-
cide scope of commerce power); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1202, 1204-
05, 1228, 1258--60 (same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 802, 811-12 (arguing Lopez 
and Morrison decisions failed to define "economic" and "non-economic" terms and 
that term "commercial" is narrower than "economic"); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 
1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in distinguishing 
economic from non-economic activities). 
130. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; Scopp, supra note 31, at 820-21; Winemiller, su-
pra note 31, at 178--79. 
131. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640, 644 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[H]istory has 
shown that categorical exclusions have proven . . . unworkable in practice."); 
Scopp, supra note 31, at 820-21. 
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power such as the Commerce Clause.132 Yet, the Court from 
1937 until 1995 was able to provide certainty by using a defer-
ential rational basis that gave the political branches the pri-
mary responsibility for defining the limits of federal author-
ity.133 
A central assumption in Lopez and Morrison is that only 
economic activities can substantially affect interstate com-
merce, but this core assumption is clearly false because non-
economic activities such as violence against women in fact have 
substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 134 In an attempt 
to side-step this reality, the Lopez and Morrison decisions tried 
to suggest that such impacts do not count because they are too 
attenuated: non-economic activities such as criminal violence 
only indirectly affect commercial activities that constitute in-
terstate commerce. 135 There is no reason to believe, however, 
that the impact of non-economic activities on interstate com-
merce is any more indirect or attenuated than, for example, the 
impact of intrastate economic activities such as growing wheat 
for home consumption that Wickard recognized as appropriate 
for aggregation. 136 The Court's economic versus non-economic 
distinction is comparable to, and as flawed as, its pre-1937 dis-
132. See Winemiller, supra note 31, at 178-79; supra note 130 and accompany-
ing text. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28, 630 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing majority's distinction between "commercial" and 
"noncommercial" activities was unworkable because it was impossible to make 
such delineations and would create "legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until 
this case, seemed reasonably well settled."). 
133. Adler, supra note 14, at 765, 767-68 (arguing that after Raich, "the judi-
cial safeguards of federalism are once again replaced with the political safeguards 
of federalism."). 
134. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,418-21; Mank, 
supra note 9, at 952, 955; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 881, 895; Scopp, supra note 
31, at 802; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 178-79. 
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17; Lopez, 514 U.s. at 567; Scopp, supra note 
31, at 802. 
136. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If chemical emana-
tions through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe commercial 
harm outside a State, why should it matter whether local factories or home fire-
places release them?"). 
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, techno-
logical, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken 
together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, 
genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State - at 
least when considered in the aggregate. 
Id. at 660 (citation omitted); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 881. 
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tinction between direct and indirect affects that excluded the 
massive interstate impacts of manufacturing from the scope of 
the Commerce Clause. 137 
In a Commerce Clause case, a court must determine the 
central or "precise" "object" of a regulatory statute-whether 
the object is the statute's regulatory "targets" or its beneficiar-
ies-and how close the nexus must be between the object and 
the commercial purposes of the Commerce Clause. 138 Lopez 
and Morrison failed to provide a framework for courts to use in 
deciding: (1) which, of possibly several subjects regulated by a 
statute, is the central or precise "object" for determining 
whether the statute regulates economic or non-economic activi-
ties and (2) whether those activities have substantial impacts 
on interstate commerce. As one commentator observed, "a 
court cannot resolve whether an object or activity is 'economic' 
or 'non-economic' without identifying what that object or activ-
ity is."139 
For example, in dicta, the SWANCC decision suggested 
that the substantial effects test requires the government to 
demonstrate that any activity it seeks to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause is the precise "object" of the regulatory stat-
ute and also that the "object" has substantial effects on inter-
137. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems fair to ask 
whether the step taken by the [Lopez] Court ... does anything but portend a re-
turn to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost 
60 years ago."); Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-55, 563, 590 (discussing and 
criticizing Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause and arguing that the Court's approach is similar to 
pre-1937 cases using direct-indirect distinction); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-72 
(same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 798-99, 802-03 (''The Lopez-Morrison test has 
not overcome the previous failures of the 'direct'l'indirect' effects test .... Fur-
thermore, the test does not successfully correlate to the statute's impact on inter-
state commerce; the 'economic'l'non-economic' distinction fails to capture the 
ESA's real effects on interstate commerce."). 
138. See Mank, supra note 9, at 928-29, 961-63; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra 
note 21, at 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-60 (arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clar-
ify which types of commercial activities are within scope of Commerce Clause and 
give courts too much discretion to decide scope of commerce power); Scopp, supra 
note 31, at 800; Seinfeld supra note 21, at 1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower 
courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities). 
139. Scopp, supra note 31, at 801. In a case involving the constitutionality of 
the Endangered Species Act under the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Circuit in 
GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton commented that the Lopez and Morrison 
decisions had not "explicitly determined the scope of the substantial effects analy-
sis." 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 179. 
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state commerce. 140 Because the SWANCC Court's discussion of 
what should be the "precise object or activity" in the case is far 
from clear,141 commentators have disagreed whether the wet-
lands or the commercial activities filling in the wetlands are 
the "object" that must substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 142 Because the wetlands are not connected to navigable 
waters, and thus have no direct connection to interstate com-
merce, if they are the "object" of the statute then the Court may 
have suggested that the government's efforts to regulate iso-
140. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (stating that whether presence of mi-
gratory birds justified the government's regulation of intrastate, isolated wetlands 
"raise[d] significant constitutional questions. For example, we would have to 
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce."); Mank, supra note 9, at 96~3; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra 
note 21, at 1243 n.252 (arguing that Lopez and Morrison focused on the commer· 
cial activities that were the "target" of the challenged statute, but that "[t]he 
SW ANCC decision, on the other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries 
of regulation - wetlands and migratory birds."). 
141. See Scopp, supra note 31, at 801 ("[T]he [SWANCC] Court failed to give 
any guidance on how to identify the precise object."). 
142. See Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 
GEO. L.J. 2143, 2163 (2002) (suggesting that SWANCC focused on the purpose of 
the statute and regulations); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce 
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003) (discussing SWANCC). 
[T]he SWANCC decision suggested that neither the value of the migra· 
tory birds nor the commercial activities that motivated the filling in of 
the wetlands could justify congressional regulation because they were 
not the precise object of the statute. Instead, the Court implied that the 
wetlands themselves are the 'object' that must substantially affect inter· 
state commerce. 
Mank, supra note 9, at 960-61; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1243 n.252 
(arguing that Lopez and Morrison focused on the commercial activities that were 
the "target" of the challenged statute, but that "[t]he SWANCC decision, on the 
other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries of regulation - wetlands 
and migratory birds"); Scopp, supra note 31, at 801. Compare Robert H. Bork & 
Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regu· 
late Commerce, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 849, 890 (2002) (stating "the object 
regulated [in SWANCC] is the intrastate water"), and Mank, supra note 9, at 962 
(''While not clearly defming the 'precise object' at issue in the case, the stronger 
argument is that the SWANCC court was focusing on the purpose of the statute 
and regulations - benefiting wetlands - rather than on the commercial activity 
being regulated, the landfill ... [T]he SWANCC Court[ ] focus[ed] on the envi· 
ronmental purposes of the statute and regulations rather than the landfill .... "), 
with Marianne Moody Jenkins & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where 
the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A 
Point and Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Perspective, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 23, 54 (2000) (explaining that in the Clean Water Act, "Congress is 
not regulating wetlands use; it is regulating the economic, and often commercial 
activity of land use and development"). 
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lated wetlands was beyond Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause. 143 If the Court meant that the commercial 
activities of filling in the wetlands are the "precise object or ac-
tivity," there is probably a stronger argument that Congress 
could regulate isolated wetlands harmed by such activity, but 
the Court also suggested that it would not exclusively focus on 
the commercial activities causing the destruction of natural re-
sources and would instead look to whether there was some 
close relationship between the natural object and the commer-
cial activities. 144 The Court's failure to define what objects or 
activities are most important in analyzing whether a statutory 
scheme may regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause 
has caused especially difficult problems for courts deciding 
whether the ESA is constitutional under the Clause. 145 
143. See Mank, supra note 7, at 854 (discussing SWANCC's implication that 
Congress may not regulate isolated wetlands under the Commerce Clause). 
144. See Blumm & Kindrell, supra note 10, at 326. 
But it is also possible [Chief Justice Rehnquist] was suggesting that the 
commercial nature of the landfill was too attenuated to provide the 
commerce necessary to support Clean Water Act jurisdiction. This might 
mean that the requisite commercial connection for the ESA take provi-
sion is the listed species' substantial effect on commerce, not the regu-
lated activity's commercial nature. 
[d.; Gerhardt, supra note 142, at 2163 (suggesting that SWANCC focused on the 
purpose of the statute and regulations); Klein, supra note 142, at 38 (discussing 
SWANCC); Mank, supra note 9, at 960-62. 
[T]he SWANCC decision suggested that neither the value of the migra-
tory birds nor the commercial activities that motivated the filling in of 
the wetlands could justify congressional regulation because they were 
not the precise object of the statute. Instead, the Court implied that the 
wetlands themselves are the 'object' that must substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 
[d.; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1243 n.252 (''The SWANCC decision, on 
the other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries of regulation - wetlands 
and migratory birds"); Scopp, supra note 31, at 801; supra notes 138-43 and ac-
companying text. 
145. See Mank, supra note 9, at 929, 961-62 (discussing the failure of the 
SWANCC Court to define the object of a regulatory statute, relating the problem 
back to uncertainties in the Lopez-Morrison framework, and discussing difficulties 
in defining the regulatory object in endangered species cases when Congress may 
aggregate intrastate activities to show substantial effects on interstate commerce 
under the Commerce Clause); Scopp, supra note 31, at 792, 801-13, 819-24 (dis-
cussing failure of the Lopez and Morrison decisions to define what is the key ob-
ject or activity of a statute, for determining what is economic or non-economic un-
der Commerce Clause, and the struggles of lower courts to define what is the 
object of the Endangered Species Act); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 179-200 (dis-
cussing difficulties faced by lower courts in cases involving the Endangered Spe-
cies Act in applying the substantial effects test and SWANCC's "object" analysis); 
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Finally, the Court's federalist attempt to use "tradition" as 
a way to limit national power is flawed because in many areas 
that Lopez and Morrison define as traditional areas of state 
control-including family law, land use law, education law and 
criminal law-there is a long history of concurrent national 
regulation. 146 The problem with using "tradition" as a test is 
that the Court did not explain clearly which areas of activity 
are "traditional" areas of state or local regulation immune from 
federal regulation. 147 Notably, in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, the Court in a 1976 opinion by Justice Rehnquist ruled 
that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to en-
force the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of 
traditional governmental functions."148 In 1985, however, the 
Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
overruled the decision because "[a]lthough National League of 
Cities supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental 
functions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how a 'tradi-
tional' function is to be distinguished from a 'nontraditional' 
one. Since then, federal and state courts have struggled with 
the task."149 
The Lopez and Morrison decisions similarly failed to pro-
vide a workable test for distinguishing between traditional and 
non-traditional state functions. For example, some decisions 
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 258-59 and accompanying 
text. 
146. See Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543--47,552-55,563,590 (criticizing the 
Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause because the federal government has played a role in many ar-
eas that the Morrison and Lopez decisions treated as "traditional" areas of state 
control); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-72; supra note 125 and accompanying text; 
infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text. But see Winemiller, supra note 31, at 
191-92 (suggesting "tradition" is a valid test for limiting Congress's power under 
the Commerce Clause). 
147. See Bilionis, supra note 35, at 500-02, 550-51 (describing Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor as taking a more deferential approach to statutory review 
than Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justices Scalia or Thomas, but observing that it 
is uncertain to what extent they will allow congressional regulation of non-
traditional intrastate activities); Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543--47, 552-55, 
563, 590 (discussing and criticizing the Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to re-
strict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, 
at 770-72 (same). 
148. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
149. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985). 
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have treated environmental regulation as distinct from tradi-
tional land use regulation, but SWANCC in dicta suggested 
otherwise.l5o As Part V will show, the protection of endangered 
species is not a traditional area of state regulation because the 
federal government and state governments have exercised con-
current jurisdiction over these species for many decades. 
The Lopez and Morrison decisions were wrong in asserting 
that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause is lim-
ited to the regulation of economic activities, that Congress may 
not consider the aggregate impact of non-economic activities 
such as violence against women on the national economy, that 
federalist principles prohibit congressional regulation of intra-
state activities, and that Congress may not regulate for moral 
purposes. Nevertheless, even accepting their reasoning, Lopez 
and Morrison did not overrule decisions applying the compre-
hensive statutory doctrine that Congress may regulate intra-
state activities that are an integral part of a national regula-
tory scheme. Both because of the comprehensive scheme 
rationale and because protection of endangered species is not a 
traditional area of state regulation, Congress may regulate in-
trastate or economically insignificant species that in the aggre-
gate do have a significant impact on interstate commerce. 
150. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in National League of Cities, 
stated that the decision "does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environ-
mental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where 
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 426 
U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In California Coastal Commission u. 
Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court recognized that federal environmental pro-
tection is distinct from state land use regulation. See 480 U.S. 572, 586-87 
(1987); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 191 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (re-
jecting the majority's suggestion that the Corps' interpretation of Clean Water Act 
(CWA) allowing regulation of isolated wetlands infringed upon the traditional 
state authority over land use because "[tJhe CWA is not a land-use code; it is a 
paradigm of environmental regulation" and "[sJuch regulation is an accepted exer-
cise of federal power."); Matthew B. Baumgartner, SW ANCC's Clear Statement: A 
Delimitation of Congress's Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollu-
tion, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2158--60 (2005) ("The Court's recognition of envi-
ronmentallaws as distinct from land use laws - even where there is some overlap 
between the two - alleviates the concern underlying Lopez and Morrison about 
federal infringement of states' rights."). 
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III. GONZALES V. RAICH: DISTINGUISHING LOPEZ AND 
MORRISON 
[VoL 78 
In 2005, the Court addressed the scope of Lopez and Morri-
son in Gonzalez v. Raich, lSI which determined the constitution-
ality of the Controlled Substances Act. 152 The CSA prohibits 
and criminalizes the possession, distribution, or manufacturing 
of marijuana (cannabis) by intrastate growers and users.1 53 Al-
though acknowledging that Congress has authority to regulate 
interstate commerce in marijuana under the CSA, the respon-
dents brought an action seeking injunctive and declaratory re-
lief prohibiting the CSA's enforcement to the extent it pre-
vented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing 
cannabis for their personal medical use under the California 
Compassionate Use Act, which authorizes limited marijuana 
use for medicinal purposes.154 After the district court denied 
respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction, ISS the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, finding that the respondents had demon-
strated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the CSA 
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause 
authority. 156 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Lopez and 
Morrison in holding that "the intrastate, noncommercial culti-
vation and possession of cannabis for personal medical pur-
poses as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to 
valid California state law" constituted a "separate and distinct 
class of activities" that was beyond the reach of the otherwise 
lSI. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000). The CSA makes it unlawful to manufacture, 
distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by 
the Act. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203. 
153. The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance, based on its high 
potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in 
medically supervised treatment. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c). This classifica-
tion renders the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal 
offense. Id. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204. 
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); Raich, 
125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200, 2204-05 n.3 ("The California Legislature recently en-
acted additional legislation supplementing the Compassionate Use Act." (citation 
omitted». 
ISS. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 
352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 
156. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. 
Ct. 2195 (2005). 
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valid federal authority to prohibit interstate commerce in can-
nabis. 157 
The Raich Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, vacated 
and remanded the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that 
the CSA did not exceed Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause as applied to the respondents because Congress 
has the authority to regulate intrastate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce even if some of the individual 
intrastate activities have only a "de minimis" impact on inter-
state commerce; as long as Congress has a rational basis for be-
lieving that the intrastate activities as a class "pose[ ] a threat 
to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."158 Ob-
serving that "[t]he similarities between this case and Wickard 
are striking," the Court maintained that the regulation of in-
trastate cultivation and use of marijuana was comparable to 
the Court's approval of government regulation of intrastate cul-
tivation and use of wheat in Wickard. 159 The Court concluded: 
"Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that 
157. Id. at 1228; see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201 (stating that the Ninth Cir-
cuit decision "placed heavy reliance on [the Supreme Court's] decisions" in Lopez 
and Morrison). 
158. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06. 
Our case law fIrmly establishes Congress's power to regulate purely local 
activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. As we stated in Wickard, 
"even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it 
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." We have 
never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When 
Congress decides that the "total incidence" of a practice poses a threat to 
a national market, it may regulate the entire class. In this vein, we have 
reiterated that when "a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances 
arising under that statute is of no consequence." 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l. 
159. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206--07. 
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home con-
sumption, a fungible cQmmodity for which there is an established, albeit 
illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
designed "to control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and for-
eign commerce in order to avoid surpluses ... and consequently control 
the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply 
and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug 
markets. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control 
would similarly affect price and market conditions."160 
Rejecting the respondents' arguments that Lopez and Mor-
rison had significantly restricted congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause, Justice Stevens emphasized that Lopez 
and Morrison had not radically changed the Court's Commerce 
Clause cases dating to 1937. He stated: "In their myopic focus, 
they overlook the larger context of modern-era Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases. Moreover, even 
in the narrow prism of respondents' creation, they read those 
cases far too broadly."161 The Raich Court observed that the 
respondents' challenge to the CSA was quite different from the 
challenges in Lopez and Morrison because the "respondents ask 
us to excise individual applications of a concededly valid statu-
tory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the par-
ties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside 
Congress's commerce power in its entirety."162 By distinguish-
ing Lopez and Morrison as decisions about single-subject stat-
utes rather than comprehensive statutes, the Raich decision 
gives Congress broad discretion to regulate non-economic, in-
trastate activities as long as it does so in a comprehensive stat-
ute.l 63 
160. Id. at 2207. 
161. Id. at 2209. 
162. See id. at 2209. But see Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. 
Filburn Displaced, 2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87-88 (2005), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2005/gonzalesdecision.pdf (criticizing Justice Ste-
vens's distinction in Raich between facial and as-applied challenges as a false di-
chotomy obscuring the need to distinguish between national and local activities). 
163. See Adler, supra note 14, at 764-65. 
Thus, so long as a statute largely regulates economic or commercial ac-
tivity - or defines a given activity at a level of generality sufficiently 
broad to cover a substantial amount of economic activity - there is no 
limit to the amount of non-commercial, intrastate activity that may also 
succumb to federal power so long as Congress enacts a sufficiently ex-
pansive regulatory regime. 
Id.; Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny of Congressional Power When 
the States Undertake Policy Experiments?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779, 783 
(2005); Kmiec, supra note 162, at 98 ("It is enough that Congress could rationally 
believe that regulating the activity (whether wholly local or not, and whether 
commercial or not) was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme or, in Con-
gress's sole judgment, was necessary to make interstate regulation effective. Those 
'tests' are without teeth."); John T. Parry, "Society Must be [Regulated}": Biopoli-
tics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853, 
859-60, 862 (2005); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich 
Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 922-23 (2005) (observing 
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Justice Stevens argued that the respondents faced a more 
difficult challenge in Raich because "[w]here the class of activi-
ties is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances' of the class."164 Distinguishing Lopez, Justice Ste-
vens maintained that the GFSZA "did not regulate any eco-
nomic activity and did not contain any requirement that the 
possession of a gun have any connection to past interstate ac-
tivity or a predictable impact on future commercial activity."165 
Thus, the GFSZA was "not an essential part of a larger regula-
tion of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could 
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."166 
In contrast, the CSA's prohibition of intrastate cultivation and 
use of marijuana, even for personal medical use under state 
law, met Lopez's standard for valid congressional legislation 
under the Commerce Clause because it was an essential part of 
a comprehensive scheme that "'could be undercut unless the in-
trastate activity were regulated."'167 Using a broad definition 
of economics, the Raich Court stated that "[b]ecause the CSA is 
a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, 
our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutional-
ity."168 
that Raich's comprehensive scheme limitation of Lopez and Morrison was pre-
dicted by some commentators); Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review 
Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325, 1332-33 (2001) (predicting that the 
Court could limit Lopez and Morrison by using comprehensive scheme rationale). 
164. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 
154 (1971) (emphasis deleted». 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995». 
167. Id. at 2210 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
168. Id. at 2211. 
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by 
the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that 
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Pro-
hibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of com-
merce'is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating com-
merce in that product. 
Id.; see also Adler, supra note 14, at 763-64 (criticizing Raich's broad definition of 
economic activity); Barnett, supra note 22, at 747 (same); Kmiec, supra note 162, 
at 88-89 (pointing out that medicinal use involves no commercial transactions); 
Parry, supra note 163, at 859-60 ("Congress is regulating economic activity in the 
broad sense defined by Raich, which includes production, distribution, possession, 
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In invalidating portions of the CSA, the Ninth Circuit 
treated "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession 
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the ad-
vice of a physician and in accordance with state law" as a 
"separate and distinct" class of activities "different in kind from 
drug trafficking" that was beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause. 169 The CSA, however, clearly rejected any medicinal 
use of marijuana. 170 Furthermore, the Supreme Court was 
concerned that the attempts by the Ninth Circuit and Justice 
O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, to treat such use as a 
"separate and distinct" class of activities beyond federal au-
thority would logically place any recreational, intrastate use of 
the substance beyond federal regulation even if a state did not 
authorize its recreational use and such recreational use would 
clearly have substantial impacts on interstate commerce in the 
drug. l7l Additionally, under the Supremacy Clause, a state's 
attempt to treat certain types of drug use as a separate class of 
activities distinct from the otherwise valid regulation of the 
CSA must fail because any such exception would swallow con-
gressional authority over states and interstate commerce. In 
Because of the "enforcement difficulties" in "distinguishing 
between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown 
elsewhere" and potential "diversion[s] into illicit channels,"173 
the Court rejected arguments that intrastate cultivation and 
use of marijuana for personal medical use under state law was 
a separate class of activities from other intrastate or interstate 
use. 174 The majority stated: "[W]e have no difficulty concluding 
or consumption of a commodity that moves in interstate commerce or that either 
effects interstate commerce or effects the regulation of interstate commerce."); 
Pushaw, supra note 35, at 898-900. 
Id. 
This judicial debate fulfills my prediction that the Court's refusal in Lo-
pez and Morrison to define "commerce," and its careless equation of that 
word with "economics," would eventually sabotage its attempt to reform 
Commerce Clause doctrine. Justice Stevens exploited that loose lan-
guage by embracing the broadest possible meaning of "economics." 
169. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228-
29 (9th Cir. 2003». 
170. See id. at 2211-12. 
171. See id. at 2211. 
172. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212-15. 
173. Id. at 2209. 
174. See supra notes 157, 169, 171-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 23~ 
37,248 and accompanying text. 
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that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to 
regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of mari-
juana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA."175 Relying upon 
the Commerce Clause as well as the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Court concluded that Congress had the authority to 
regulate all intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana even if 
the respondents were correct that their individual use would 
not affect interstate commerce. 176 "That the regulation en-
snares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we 
have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual 
components of that larger scheme."177 
Although it is possible to distinguish the facts and compre-
hensive statutory scheme in Raich from the statutes at issue in 
Lopez and Morrison, the approach to the Commerce Clause in 
Justice Stevens's Raich majority opinion is closer to the Court's 
pre-Lopez decisions. Justice Stevens and three of the four jus-
tices who joined his Raich majority opinion-Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer-had all dissented in both Lopez and 
Morrison so one may easily question whether they agree with 
the spirit of those cases. 178 Justice Kennedy, who had been 
. with the federalist majority in Lopez and Morrison, also joined 
the Raich majority opinion. 179 Because he did not write a con-
curring opinion in Raich, it is impossible to know for sure why 
Justice Kennedy believed that federal regulation of intrastate 
medical marijuana was constitutional and thus different from 
the activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison. However, his Lo-
pez concurrence appeared to give greater latitude to congres-
sional authority to regulate intrastate activities so long as the 
legislation did not intrude on areas within the traditional state 
175. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l. 
176. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195; Adler, supra note 14, at 762-77 (arguing that 
Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and Morrison where the litigant chal-
lenges a law as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing 
Raich's use of the comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich in-
creases the probability that the Supreme Court will find the Endangered Species 
Act constitutional); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l. 
177. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. 
178. See Althouse, supra note 163, at 782 ("Stevens, like three other members 
of the Raich majority, dissented in Lopez and Morrison, and presumably has little 
interest in nurturing the commercial/noncommercial distinction. I would expect 
these four Justices some time soon to cite Raich for the proposition that the com-
mercial/noncommercial distinction has been abandoned." (citation omitted». 
179. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2197. 
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police power. 180 In cases involving a comprehensive statutory 
scheme, the Raich decision signals that the Court will apply a 
deferential rational basis approach in deciding whether Con-
gress may regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if such 
regulation is necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate 
commerce as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. 181 As 
the conclusion will show, after Raich, there is a much stronger 
probability that the Court will uphold the constitutionality of 
the ESA under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 182 
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S RAlCH CONCURRENCE: THE NECESSARY 
AND PROPER CLAUSE 
Justice Scalia's concurrence relied on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause rather than the majority's comprehensive 
scheme rationale to justify congressional regulation of medical 
marijuana under the Commerce Clause. His approach to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause provides a second and separate 
argument for regulating endangered species under the Com-
merce Clause. 
180. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-81 (1995) (Ken· 
nedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14, at 768-70 (discussing possible reasons 
why Justice Kennedy joined Raich majority opinion); Althouse, supra note 105, at 
801-04 (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" concurrence in Lopez as being 
more moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion); Mank, supra 
note 5, at 740-41 (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach in rejecting 
federal interference with education, a traditional state concern); McAllister, supra 
note 105, at 238-42 (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to federal-
ism as model for future cases); supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. 
181. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; Barnett, supra note 22, at 747. 
The majority in Raich adopted the most deferential version of the ra-
tional basis test. This is, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of the 
Court's holding (and Justice Scalia's concurrence). Any heightened scru-
tiny provided by Lopez and Morrison could be evaded by a traditional ra-
tional basis approach to determining whether it is "essential" to reach 
the intrastate activity in question. 
Id.; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing Raich's use of the 
comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich increases the probability 
that the Supreme Court will find the ESA constitutional). 
182. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing Raich's use of 
the comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich increases the prob-
ability that the Supreme Court will fmd the ESA constitutional); see also Adler, 
supra note 14, at 762-65 (arguing Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and 
Morrison where the litigant challenges the law as applied). 
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A. Justice Scalia's Raich Concurrence 
Although Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's holding, 
he concurred separately in the judgment. 183 He explained, 
"[M]y understanding of the doctrinal foundation on which that 
holding rests is, if not inconsistent with that of the Court, at 
least more nuanced."184 Justice Scalia argued that the sub-
stantial effects test "is misleading because, unlike the chan-
nels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not 
themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to 
regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause 
alone."185 Instead, he contended that since 1838 the Court had 
recognized that "Congress's regulatory authority over intra-
state activities that are not themselves part of interstate com-
merce (including activities that have a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause."186 Furthermore, he argued that "[w]here necessary to 
make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress 
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not them-
selves substantially affect interstate commerce."187 In contrast 
to the majority opinion, which only mentioned the Necessary 
183. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198, 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra 
note 14, at 766--68 (discussing Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence). . 
184. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Adler, supra 
note 14, at 762-63 ("Justice Scalia's concurrence, while providing a more nu· 
anced-and perhaps a more doctrinally satisfying-rationale, was no less expan-
sive in its impact. Both the majority and concurring opinions hollowed out Morri-
son's core-leaving it without any substance, if any life at all."); Kmiec, supra note 
162, at 73, 90-91, 99 (criticizing Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence as imposing no 
meaningful restrictions on congressional power and ignoring original intent of 
framers in creating federalist structure in Constitution). 
185. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-16 (Scalia, J. concurring) (second emphasis 
added). 
186. [d. at 2216 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); Shreveport Rate 
Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39-
40 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.s. (12 Pet.) 72, 
78 (1838»); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 807-11 (arguing courts and scholars have 
under-appreciated the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the develop-
ment of Commerce Clause doctrine); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1288--91 (arguing 
Congress's expanded power to regulate commerce came not from direct power un-
der the Commerce Clause, but rather from an interplay between the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
187. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J. concurring); see Pushaw, supra note 
35, at 901-02. 
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and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia placed far more emphasis on 
that Clause. Indeed, Justice Scalia quoted and applied Chief 
Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. 188 
Justice Scalia argued that many of the Court's important 
Commerce Clause cases were in fact based in part on the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, and had reached intrastate activities 
under the latter Clause that they could not have reached under 
the former Clause alone.l 89 He maintained that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause applied in "two general circumstances."190 
First and "[m]ost directly," he cited the Jones & Laughlin Steel 
decision for the principle that "the commerce power permits 
Congress not only to devise rules for the governance of com-
merce between States but also to facilitate interstate commerce 
by eliminating potential obstructions, and to restrict it by 
eliminating potential stimulants."191 
Although Lopez and Morrison had limited the substantial 
effects test where it might "obliterate the distinction between 
what is national and what is local"192 and had "rejected the ar-
gument that Congress may regulate non-economic activity 
based solely on the effect that it may have on interstate com-
merce through a remote chain of inferences,"193 Justice Scalia 
argued that the Lopez decision had "implicitly acknowledged" 
that "Congress's authority to enact laws necessary and proper 
for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws 
directed against economic activities that have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce."194 Neither Lopez nor Morrison 
had directly invoked or discussed the Necessary and Proper 
188. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819); see Reynolds & Denning, supra 
note 163, at 925. 
189. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2216-18 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, 
supra note 14, at 496 (discussing Justice Scalia's Baick concurrence, which em-
phasized the Necessary and Proper Clause); Claeys, supra note 19, at 814-15 
(same); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 901-02 (same). 
190. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
191. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 
(1937». 
192. Id. at 2216 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995) 
(quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 
(1935»). 
193. Id. at 2217 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66 and United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000»; see Pushaw, supra note 35, at 901-02 (discuss-
ing Lopez's and Morrison's reasoning that Congress may not justify regulation 
under Commerce Clause by relying on remote, attenuated impacts); Seinfeld, su-
pra note 21, at 1269-76. 
194. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Clause. 195 He claimed that the Lopez decision had recognized 
that Congress could regulate non-economic, intrastate activi-
ties that are "'an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be under-
cut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."'196 He 
argued that the Lopez decision meant by this statement to refer 
to previous decisions "permitting the regulation of intrastate 
activities 'which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct 
the exercise of the granted power."'197 He suggested that the 
Lopez Court would have approved the statement in the Court's 
Wrightwood Dairy decision that "where Congress has the au-
thority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it pos-
sesses every power needed to make that regulation effec-
tive."'198 
Justice Scalia argued that the power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause "'to make ... regulation effective'" is "dis-
tinct" from congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate economic activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce, although he acknowledged that the two 
types of authority "commonly overlap[]" and that they "may in 
some cases have been confused."199 He contended that congres-
sional power to regulate under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is broader than under the Commerce Clause because 
"[t]he regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a 
comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though 
the intrastate activity does not itself 'substantially affect' inter-
195. See Beck, supra note 46, at 584, 616, 624-26, 648-49 (observing neither 
Lopez nor Morrison had invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause, but arguing 
both cases roughly followed the Clause's jurisprudence as defined in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-422 (1819»; Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 
811 (observing that Lopez had not acknowledged Congress's authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
196. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 561). 
197. Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942), and citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941) and 
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.s. 342, 353 (1914». 
198. Id. (quoting Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 118-19); see Beck, supra 
note 46, at 619 (discussing Wrightwood Dairy's invocation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 809-10 (same). 
199. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Wrightwood 
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 119); ct. John T. Valauri, The Clothes Have No Emperor, or, 
Cabining the Commerce Clause, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 425-35 (2004) (argu-
ing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is essential for Congress to exercise 
broad authority under Commerce Clause). 
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state commerce."200 Furthermore, as Lopez suggested,201 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that "Congress may regulate even non-
economic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a 
more general regulation of interstate commerce."202 He as-
serted that in determining congressional power to regulate un-
der the Necessary and Proper Clause that "[t]he relevant ques-
tion is simply whether the means chosen are 'reasonably 
adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end under the com-
merce power ."203 
For example, Justice Scalia observed that in the important 
Darby 204 case, the Court reached some intrastate activities un-
der the Commerce Clause, but relied on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to affirm Congress's requirement that employers 
keep employment records to demonstrate compliance with the 
FLSA regulatory scheme "on the sole ground that '[t]he re-
quirement for records even of the intrastate transaction is an 
appropriate means to the legitimate end."'205 Justice Scalia ob-
served that in 1914, long before the Jones & Laughlin Steel de-
cision, the Court in the Shreveport Rate Cases stated that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause "does not give 'Congress ... the 
authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as 
such,' but it does allow Congress 'to take all measures neces-
sary or appropriate to' the effective regulation of the interstate 
market, 'although intrastate transactions ... may thereby be 
controlled."'206 He noted that the Jones & Laughlin Steel deci-
sion had concluded that the Shreveport Rate Cases' broad ap-
200. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
201. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
202. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
203. Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941». 
204. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
205. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Darby, 312 
U.S. at 125); see Beck, supra note 46, at 618-19 (discussing Darby's invocation of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause); David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper 
Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARv. J.L. & 
PuB. POL'y 107, 110-11 (1998) ("The Court also upheld ... the wage and hour 
terms of the Act [in Darby], relying not on the Commerce Clause itself, but [on] .. 
. the Necessary and Proper Clause."); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 809 (discuss-
ing Darby's invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause); Seinfeld, supra note 
21, at 1297-1300 (criticizing Darby's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as overly broad); Valauri, supra note 199, at 427-28 (arguing that the Su-
preme Court in Darby recognized the limits of congressional authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
206. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914». 
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proach to congressional authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to implement Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause "[was] not limited to" the regulation of "in-
strumentalities of commerce," but that Shreveport's logic ap-
plied as well to the congressional regulation of intrastate ac-
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce.207 
Justice Scalia rejected Justice O'Connor's argument that 
''by permitting Congress to regulate activities necessary to ef-
fective interstate regulation, the Court reduces Lopez and Mor-
rison to little 'more than a drafting guide."'208 He maintained 
that congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to implement Congress's authority under the Commerce 
Clause was limited because "the power to enact laws enabling 
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exer-
cised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an inter-
state market, and it extends only to those measures necessary 
to make the interstate regulation effective."209 Defending the 
majority opinion, he argued, "As Lopez itself states, and the 
Court affirms today, Congress may regulate non-economic in-
trastate activities only where the failure to do so 'could ... un-
dercut' its regulation of interstate commerce."210 
He concluded that congressional authority under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause to enact those measures necessary to 
make the interstate regulation effective "is not a power that 
threatens to obliterate the line between 'what is truly national 
and what is truly local."'211 
According to Justice Scalia, Lopez and Morrison had clari-
fied that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to "regu-
late certain 'purely local' activity within the States based solely 
on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the in-
terstate market."212 Neither case, however, had "declare[d] 
non-economic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond 
the reach of the Federal Government."213 Lopez and Morrison 
had not "involved the power of Congress to exert control over 
207. [d. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38 (1937». 
208. [d. (quoting id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting». 
209. [d. 
210. [d. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995» (alteration 
in original). 
211. [d. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68). 
212. [d. at 2218. 
213. [d.; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 495. 
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intrastate activities in connection with a more comprehensive 
scheme of regulation."214 Indeed, according to Justice Scalia, 
"Lopez expressly disclaimed that it was such a case."215 Al-
though the Supreme Court in Morrison did not address 
whether it was a case involving a comprehensive scheme, the 
court of appeals' decision below "made clear that it was not."216 
Thus, he contended that Justice O'Connor's claim that there 
was no significant difference between the comprehensive 
scheme of the CSA and the more limited statutory regimes in 
Lopez and Morrison "misunderstand[s] the nature of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact 
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not 
within its authority to enact in isolation."217 
Justice Scalia argued that "there are other restraints upon 
the Necessary and Proper Clause authority."218 He observed 
that Chief Justice Marshall had written in McCulloch v. Mary-
land,219 the first important Court case to address the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, that "even when the end is constitu-
tional and legitimate, the means must be 'appropriate' and 
'plainly adapted' to that end."220 Also, Chief Justice Marshall 
214. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, su-
pra note 14, at 495. 
215. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
561). 
216. Id. (citing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 834-35 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (en bane». 
217. Id. (quoting id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); citing McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819». 
218. Id. 
219. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-22. 
220. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218--19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 812-17 (arguing Neces-
sary and Proper Clause as interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland places limits on national power and respects federalist principles); Gary 
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdic-
tional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 286--89 (1993) 
(same). Some commentators have contended that the McCulloch decision did not 
primarily rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, 
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1127, 1134 n.33 (2001) ("Chief Justice Marshall did not rely on the text of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause to confer broad legislative authority on Congress; 
rather, he merely interpreted the Clause as confIrming his preceding structural 
argument concerning the broad scope of implied congressional powers."); see also 
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1289 n.161 (discussing Caminker's argument that 
McCulloch did not rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause). Even if these schol-
ars are right, the McCulloch decision has strongly influenced the Court's under-
standing of the Clause. See Beck, supra note 46, at 584, 616, 624-26, 648--49 (ob-
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had stated that the means "may not be otherwise 'prohibited' 
and must be 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution."'221 Justice Scalia maintained that two Court decisions 
from the 1990s prohibiting the federal government from forcing 
state officials to enforce federal laws, Printz v. United States222 
and New York v. United States,223 "affirm that a law is not 
'proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause 
'[w]hen [it] violates [~ constitutional] principle of state sover-
eignty."'224 Thus, he suggested that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause respected federalist principles and would not obliterate 
the line between state and national authority.225 
Addressing the facts in Raich, Justice Scalia argued that 
the Commerce Clause clearly authorized Congress to prohibit 
all commerce in marijuana, including non-economic possession 
for personal medical use, "as a necessary part of a larger regu-
lation."226 He agreed with the majority opinion that Congress 
could appropriately prohibit all economic and non-economic use 
of marijuana because it is a "fungible commodit[y]" and, there-
fore, any marijuana used for personal medical reasons could 
easily be diverted to the interstate market in the drug.227 
Based on McCulloch's principle that Congress does not have to 
trust state laws to accomplish a federal purpose, Justice Scalia 
serving neither Lopez nor Morrison had invoked the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, but arguing both cases roughly followed the Clause as defined in 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-22); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 820-22, 
831 (arguing courts should follow McCulloch's approach to interpreting Congress's 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 
1289 n.161, 1292-97 (arguing McCulloch decision has strongly influenced the 
Court's understanding of the Clause even if that case did not actually rely on the 
Clause). 
221. Id. at 2219 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
222. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
223. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
224. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. 
at 923-24; citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166) (alteration in original); see also Beck, 
supra note 46, at 628-32 (discussing Printz, New York and Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
225. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gardbaum, supra 
note 81, at 812-31 (arguing Necessary and Proper Clause places limits on na-
tional power and respects federalist principles); Lawson & Granger, supra note 
220, at 271-72 (same). But see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress unlimited power to 
undermine federalist principles); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 903 (same); Reynolds 
& Denning, supra note 163, at 924-26 (same). 
226. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
227. Id. 
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concluded that Congress in the CSA could reasonably conclude 
that it was necessary to enact a total prohibition on marijuana 
use rather than relying on state laws restricting the drug's use 
to medical purposes that might not be effective.228 
B. Raich's Dissenting Opinions 
Three of the five justices who comprised the majority in 
Lopez and Morrison dissented in Raich because they found that 
its interpretation of the Commerce Clause was inconsistent 
with those decisions: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor 
and Justice Thomas.229 
1. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, who was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,230 ar-
gued that both the majority opinion and Justice Scalia's con-
curring opinion were inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison as 
well as broader federalist principles because they allowed Con-
gress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities.231 Justice 
O'Connor criticized both the majority and Justice Scalia for us-
ing the comprehensive scheme rationale to evade federalist 
limits on congressional authority.232 She argued that the Gov-
ernment had failed to demonstrate "that the possession and 
use of homegrown marijuana for medical purposes, in Califor-
nia or elsewhere, has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce" or "that regulating such activity is necessary to an in-
terstate regulatory scheme."233 She also criticized the 
228. Id. at 2219-20 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424). 
229. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in both Lopez and 
Morrison, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer dissented in each case. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600. 
230. Justice Thomas did not join Part III of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opin· 
ion, which expressed her personal view that if she were a California citizen or leg-
islator that she would not have supported California's law exempting certain cate-
gories of medical marijuana use. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198; id. at 2220, 2229 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
231. Id. at 2221-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 898-
99. 
232. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Pushaw, supra 
note 35, at 903. 
233. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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majority's and Justice Scalia's use of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to justify congressional regulation of medical marijuana 
because Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause had to be "consistent with basic constitutional princi-
ples," including federalism. 234 She argued that the majority's 
and Justice Scalia's approach to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause would logically have led the Court in Lopez to conclude 
that the GFSZA was constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause because possession of guns could "conceivabl[y]" have 
substantial impacts on interstate commerce.235 
Addressing Congress's authority to regulate personal, me-
dicinal use of marijuana despite state laws authorizing and 
regulating its use, Justice O'Connor contended that "[t]here is 
simply no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana users 
constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a 
discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit 
drug market-or otherwise to threaten the CSA regime."236 
She argued that the respondents had demonstrated that such 
users were a separate class from recreational users of the drug 
and that the government had failed to demonstrate any diver-
sion of medicinal marijuana into interstate markets.237 
Justice O'Connor appropriately questioned whether the 
majority's deferential rational basis standard of review would 
have led it to decide that the VAWA at issue in Morrison was 
constitutional because of the congressional findings in the stat-
ute's legislative history concluding that gender-based violence 
has significant impacts on interstate commerce.238 Her dis-
senting opinion failed, however, to grapple with the numerous 
decisions that Lopez and Morrison had not overruled and that 
the Court had never changed the deferential rational basis 
234. Id.; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 903. 
235. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, if it were enough in "substantial effects" cases for the Court to 
supply conceivable justifications for intrastate regulation related to an 
interstate market, then we could have surmised in Lopez that guns in 
school zones are "never more than an instant from the interstate mar-
ket" in guns already subject to extensive federal regulation, ... recast 
Lopez as a Necessary and Proper Clause case, and thereby upheld the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. 
Id. (quoting id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted». 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 2226-29. 
238. Id. at 2227-28. 
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standard of review that it had used since 1937.239 The majority 
opinion and even Justice Scalia's concurrence may be at odds 
with the spirit if not the letter of Lopez and Morrison, but 
surely these opinions are consistent with Wickard, Darby, Ho-
del and Wrightwood Dairy, which remain good law. 
In her dissenting opinion in Garcia, Justice O'Connor ac-
knowledged that under the Commerce Clause "[e]ven if a par-
ticular individual's activity has no perceptible interstate effect, 
it can be reached by Congress through regulation of that class 
of activity in general as long as that class, considered as a 
whole, affects interstate commerce."240 As Part V will show, 
courts have and should consider endangered and threatened 
species as a class rather than individual species. Her dissent-
ing opinion in Garcia emphasized the need for the Court to 
balance national interests against state autonomy.241 Part V 
will demonstrate that the ESA respects that balance. Although 
her retirement moots the issue, it is possible that Justice 
O'Connor would have voted in favor of the constitutionality of 
the ESA if the issue had come before her.242 
2. Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion 
In a solo dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argued that 
the federal government may not regulate intrastate growth and 
consumption of marijuana "that has never been bought or sold, 
that has never crossed state lines, and that has had no demon-
strable effect on the national market for marijuana."243 Apply-
ing a narrow definition of the Commerce Clause's original 
meaning that interprets the Clause only to "empower[ ] Con-
239. See supra notes 36-80 and accompanying text; infra notes 390-95 and ac-
companying text. 
240. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
241. Id. at 584-89. 
242. See Mank, supra note 5, at 734 (speculating that Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy might support the constitutionality of the ESA); cf. Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1995) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) (approving agency's broad interpretation of the term "take" under 
the ESA). See generally Byron Dailey, Note, The Five Faces of Federalism: A 
State-Power Quintet Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1274-77, 1280-82, 
1286-87 (2001) (arguing Justices O'Connor and Kennedy apply more a moderate 
approach to state rights and national power issues than Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Scalia, and, particularly, Justice Thomas). 
243. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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gress to regulate the buying and selling of goods and services 
trafficked across state lines," he concluded that the respon-
dent's intrastate use did not constitute "commerce" as defined 
by the Clause.244 Other justices and many commentators have 
disagreed with Justice Thomas's narrow reading of the Com-
merce Clause's original meaning or are unwilling to overrule 
decades of precedent authorizing Congress to use the Clause to 
regulate many economic activities beyond mere transportation 
of goods.245 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that whether the CSA's 
prohibition of personal medical use of marijuana that is grown 
and consumed entirely in one state is authorized by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause is a more difficult issue than whether 
the statute's prohibition is valid under the Commerce Clause 
alone.246 Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's McCulloch opinion, 
Justice Thomas observed that Congress, to act under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, "must select a means that is 'appro-
priate' and 'plainly adapted' to executing an enumerated power; 
the means cannot be otherwise 'prohibited' by the Constitution; 
and the means cannot be inconsistent with 'the letter and spirit 
of the Constitution."'247 Applying the McCulloch standard, he 
concluded that the CSA's regulation of the respondents' con-
duct was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because the respondents' medici-
nal use of the drug was separate and distinct from the commer-
cial, interstate market in the drug, especially due to the re-
strictions on medicinal use in California's Compassionate Use 
Act.248 Even if it was correct that a small amount of medicinal 
marijuana was in fact diverted to commercial, interstate mar-
kets, he asserted that the Government had failed to demon-
244. [d. at 2229-30 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586-89 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting». 
245. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 5, at 745; Kmiec, supra note 162, at 92-94 ("In 
his Raich dissent, Thomas does not discuss how he would reconcile the commerce 
power, properly limited, and the modern regulatory state, but he clearly indicates 
that if a satisfactory answer is to be found, it is best guided by original under-
standing."); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 905, 907 (observing that Thomas's original-
ist approach to Commerce Clause would require Court to overrule decades of 
precedent and raises many practical difficulties). 
246. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230 (footnotes omitted). 
247. [d. at 2231 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 
(1819); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 163-64 (1985». 
248. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231-32. 
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strate that the CSA's prohibition on all medicinal use was 
"necessary" to achieve the statute's goals when the huge vol-
ume of commercial marijuana is compared to the tiny amount 
of medical marijuana that could be diverted.249 
Additionally, Justice Thomas argued that "[e]ven assuming 
the CSA's ban on locally cultivated and consumed marijuana is 
'necessary,' that does not mean it is also 'proper."'250 He argued 
that using the Necessary and Proper Clause to prohibit intra-
state, noncommercial cultivation and consumption of mari-
juana was inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Consti-
tution's federalist structure and principles because the CSA 
impermissibly imposed a general police power over noncom-
mercial, intrastate activities.251 
Justice Thomas's originalist approach to the Commerce 
Clause and his narrow interpretation of McCulloch are incon-
sistent with decades of precedent allowing broad congressional 
regulation of economic activities beyond mere transportation of 
goods.252 In light of his narrow, originalist interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Jus-
tice Thomas is the Justice who is most likely to hold that the 
ESA is unconstitutional, at least in regard to intrastate or 
commercially valueless species. 
V. THE ESA's COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR PROTECTING ALL 
ENDANGERED SPECIES IS A "NECESSARY AND PROPER" 
MEANS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
In light of Raich and a series of Commerce Clause deci-
sions from Darby to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, this Part 
demonstrates that the ESA is constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause because it does not interfere with traditional 
state authority as the protection of threatened species has been 
a concurrent area of state and federal responsibility for many 
decades. Furthermore, comprehensive national regulation of 
these species prevents a "race to the bottom" among states. 
Additionally, the ESA's aggregation of all endangered species is 
249. Id.at 2233. 
250. Id. at 2233. 
251. Id. at 2233-34. 
252. Ct. Pushaw, supra note 35, at 905, 907 (observing that Thomas's original-
ist approach to Commerce Clause would require Court to overrule decades of 
precedent and raises many practical difficulties). 
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necessary and proper because it serves several reasonable con-
gressional purposes in protecting the biodiversity of important 
ecosystems that have significant current and potential future 
benefits. For all these reasons, it is appropriate for courts to 
defer to Congress's comprehensive scheme in the ESA under a 
rational basis standard of review. 
A. After Lopez and Morrison, Is the Endangered Species 
Act Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause? 
In enacting the 1973 ESA to protect a wide range of en-
dangered and threatened species, "Congress primarily relied on 
its power under the Commerce Clause."253 The text and the 
legislative history of the 1973 ESA justified regulation of en-
dangered and threatened species under the Commerce Clause 
both by discussing their actual and potential impact on inter-
state commerce and also by explaining that commercial devel-
opment affecting interstate commerce was a primary cause of 
their extinction. 254 Under its deferential approach to the 
253. Mank, supra note 9, at 937-38; see Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-98; Nagle, suo 
pra note 5, at 192-93. "[Congress] also continued to use its authority under the 
Property Clause to regulate federal lands and the Spending Clause to regulate 
federal agencies and provide incentives for cooperation by states." Mank, supra 
note 9, at 937. 
254. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (stating that species threatened with extinction 
are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific 
value to the Nation and its people"); id. § 1531(a)(1) (stating that "various species 
of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a 
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate con· 
cern and conservation"); H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) Gustifying the pro-
tection of endangered species under the Commerce Clause on the potential future 
economic and medical benefits of preserving a wide variety of species and a robust 
genetic heritage). 
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable .... 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other 
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants 
which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the point, 
who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating 
those plants for all time? Sheer self interest impels us to be cautious. 
Id. See generally Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-98 (discussing emphasis on future eco-
nomic and medical benefits in 1973 ESA's legislative history and concluding that 
congressional concern for future economic benefits was appropriate basis for na-
tional regulation under Commerce Clause); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (same); Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30, 756-57, 789-92 (arguing that 
Congress, in the 1973 ESA legislative history, emphasized concern for future eco-
nomic and medical benefits); Mank, supra note 9, at 937-38 (same); Nagle, supra 
note 5, at 193 (same). 
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Commerce Clause in 1973, the Court almost certainly would 
have upheld the constitutionality of the ESA. 
The Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC decisions raise serious 
questions about whether many of the species protected by the 
ESA have sufficient impacts on interstate commerce to justify 
regulation under the Commerce Clause, but ultimately those 
questions are answered by the comprehensive scheme and Nec-
essary and Proper justifications in Raich for regulating intra-
state activities.255 About half of all endangered or threatened 
species have habitats limited to one state, and many intrastate 
species have little economic value in interstate commerce.256 
Similarly, many other threatened or endangered species that 
cross state lines lack significant commercial value.257 Accord-
ingly, in recent years, three federal courts of appeals have ap-
plied different and sometimes clearly contradictory rationales 
to justify regulation of endangered species under the Com-
merce Clause.258 It is not surprising that courts have struggled 
255. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text; infra notes 256-59 and ac· 
companying text. 
256. See, e.g., GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003) (six species of subterra-
nean, cave-dwelling invertebrate spiders and beetles living only in Texas); Rancho 
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arroyo toad living only 
in California); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043 (Delhi Sand Flower-Loving Fly living only 
in California); id. at 1052 (half of endangered species living in one state); id. at 
1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (Delhi Sand Flower-Loving Fly living only in 
California). Hawaii has the most species that are found in only one state. See 
DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF 
EXTINCTIONS 19, 41, 214, 230-32, 252, 256, 264, 313-21, 342-43, 379, 606 (1996) 
(discussing unique extinct and endangered species on islands comprising Hawaii); 
Anne McKibbin, The Whole-Ecosystem Approach to the Commerce Clause and 
Article III Standing in Environmental Cases 15-16 (Sept. 28, 2004), 
http://ssrn.comlabstract=597104(''Thirty-six endangered and two threatened 
animal species exist only in Hawaii"; based on information downloaded from U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service's website on Feb. 28, 2004). According to a 2004 study, 
thirty-one states, two territories, and the District of Columbia contain at least one 
isolated, intrastate species listed as endangered or threatened. McKibbin, supra, 
at 16 (listing the following: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, GA, HI, !D, IL, KY,LA, 
MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NM, NY, NY, OH, OR, Puerto Rico, TN, TX, 
UT, VA, VI, WA, WI, WV, WY, and Guam; based on information downloaded from 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's website on Feb. 28, 2004). A list of all threatened 
and endangered species is available at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's web-
site at http://www.fws.gov/endangeredlwildlife.html#Species. 
257. See, e.g., GDF, 326 F.3d at 624-25 (six species of subterranean, cave 
dwelling invertebrate spiders and beetles with no commercial value); Rancho 
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072 (arroyo toad with no commercial value); NAHB, 130 F.3d 
at 1053 n.14 (Wald, J.), 1063 n.1, 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (Delhi Sand 
Flower-Loving Fly with no commercial value). 
258. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 340-46, 381-85 
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to apply the rationales in the Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC 
decisions to the ESA because the Supreme Court in those cases 
failed to: (1) define which types of "traditional" state regulatory 
activity are protected from federal regulation under federalist 
principles; (2) explain the line between economic and non-
economic activities; or (3) articulate when Congress may regu-
late intrastate non-economic activities as part of a comprehen-
sive legislative scheme. 259 
The Raich Court's highly deferential approach to evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of comprehensive statutory schemes 
under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
enables a court reviewing the constitutionality of the ESA to 
avoid these three complex and confusing issues. Regulation of 
intrastate species under the ESA is constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause be-
cause, as will be shown in Parts Band C, there is a rational ba-
sis for including intrastate and commercially insignificant spe-
cies within the ESA's comprehensive scheme. Therefore, such 
regulation is consistent with federalist principles.26o 
B. The ESA Does Not Interfere with Traditional State 
Authority 
Both the Lopez and Morrison decisions emphasized the 
importance of preserving traditional state regulatory authority 
from federal usurpation as a factor in Commerce Clause analy-
sis.261 In dicta, the SWANCC decision added state and local 
government's land use decisions as another area of traditional 
state authority that should be protected from overly broad fed-
eral regulation under the guise of the Commerce Clause.262 
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich took a broad view 
of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper 
and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text. 
260. See infra notes 298, 311-13, 315-20, 369-74, 402-04, 411-13, 417 and ac-
companying text. 
261. See supra notes 94, 101, 105, 114-15, 118, 125-26 and accompanying text. 
262. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (stating broad interpretation of 
federal authority over isolated waters would "alter[ ] the federal-state framework 
by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power"); Mank, supra 
note 5, at 769-73 (discussing SWANCC's dicta discussion of Commerce Clause 
and traditional state authority); Mank, supra note 9, at 929, 959 (same); supra 
notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
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Clause to effectuate federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause, but also emphasized that federal authority under ei-
ther Clause was limited by fundamental federalist principles in 
the Constitution.263 On the other hand, the majority in Raich 
implicitly gave less deference to traditional state authority over 
intrastate activities that are regulated under a comprehensive 
federal statutory scheme. 
Even under the broad view of states' rights in Lopez and 
Morrison, the ESA's comprehensive scheme is constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause. The ESA does not intrude on 
traditional state authority because the conservation of scarce 
natural resources, including endangered and threatened spe-
cies, has been a concurrent area of state and federal responsi-
bility for many decades.264 In 1920, the Supreme Court in Mis-
souri v. Holland held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 
1918 did not infringe on state rights guaranteed by the Tenth 
Amendment and that it did not divest states of their property 
right in wild birds because the treaty and its implementing leg-
islation took precedence over any conflicting power of regula-
tion under the Supremacy Clause.265 In 1979, the Supreme 
Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma266 held that states do not "own" 
the wildlife within their borders and that state laws regulating 
wildlife are subordinate to congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.267 The Hughes decision acknowledged that 
states have an important role in regulating wildlife within 
their borders, but held that the federal government has concur-
rent authority in conjunction with the states over any wildlife 
263. See supra notes 183-228 and accompanying text. 
264. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,492,499-505 (4th Cir. 2000); MICHAEL 
J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 
15-38 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing growth of federal regulation of wildlife and the 
continuing state role); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-80; Mank, supra note 9, at 993, 
999-100l. 
265. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (discussing Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 
128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000»); 
Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The 
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 
701-02 (2005). 
266. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
267. Id. at 329-35 (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (hold-
ing states own the wildlife in their borders»; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 265, at 
699-707 (discussing Supreme Court's gradual rejection of Geer doctrine that state 
own wildlife culminating in its Hughes decision); Mank, supra note 5, at 774 
(same). 
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that affects interstate commerce.268 In 1999, in Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (Mille Lacs),269 the Court 
upheld Chippewa Indian rights under an 1837 treaty that au-
thorized the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather independent of 
state regulation.27o The Court concluded that the Native 
American treaty rights were "reconcilable with state sover-
eignty over natural resources."271 The Mille Lacs decision 
clearly stated that the federal government has concurrent pow-
ers with the states over wildlife.272 Accordingly, Congress has 
the authority to regulate all wildlife because "in areas of con-
current power, Congress has unlimited constitutional authority 
to preempt the states-that is, legislatively to abolish constitu-
tionally concurrent state lawmaking power and to convert con-
current federal power into exclusive power."273 
For over 100 years, the federal government has played a 
greater role than the states in preserving threatened or endan-
gered species.274 Due to public concerns about the impending 
extinction of bison in the Western plains, Congress established 
a national park system in 1894 by creating Yellowstone Na-
tional Park, which "provided crucial habitat for the few remain-
ing bison, preventing their complete extinction in the United 
States."275 In 1900, Congress took its first statutory step to-
268. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-38; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (interpreting Hughes 
as giving federal government" concurrent authority with states over wildlife); 
Mank, supra note 5, at 774 (same) ; Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); Lilly 
Santaniello, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act's Regula-
tion of Intrastate Species on Private Land, 10 HAsTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'y 39, 53 (2003); White, supra note 5, at 249 (same). 
269. 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
270. Id. at 175-76, 208. 
271. Id. at 205. 
272. Id. at 204 ("Although States have important interests in regulating wild-
life and natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the 
Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumer-
ated constitutional powers .... "); Mank, supra note 5, at 775. 
273. Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 797. 
274. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining Con-
gress's historical involvement in conservation); Mank, supra note 5, at 773-76 
(arguing federal government has played leading role in protecting endangered 
species); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); White, supra note 5, at 221-22 
(same); Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A 
Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 469 (1999) 
(same). 
275. SHANNON PETERSEN, ACTING FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE STATUTORY 
ARK 8 (2002); see also White, supra note 5, at 221 (same); Daniel J. Lowenberg, 
Comment, The Texas Cave Bug and the California Arroyo Toad "Take" on the 
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ward protecting threatened species with the Lacey Act,276 
which originally forbade the interstate transport of animals 
killed in violation of state law and now applies to all wild ani-
mals, including those bred in captivity, and to plants protected 
by treaty or state law.277 Lower federal courts addressing the 
constitutionality of the Lacey Act, which does not preempt 
state wildlife laws, have all upheld the law as a permissible ex-
ercise of the commerce power.278 In 1918, after President 
Woodrow Wilson signed a treaty with Canada to protect migra-
tory birds, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 
1918, which forbade the taking of many bird species and explic-
itly preempted inconsistent state laws.279 In 1940, after the 
Supreme Court had adopted a broader interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause in Jones & Laughlin Steel, Congress invoked 
its authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Bald 
Eagle Protection Act, which forbids taking, possessing, selling, 
or exporting bald eagles or any of their parts.280 
States have not traditionally regulated or protected most 
threatened or endangered species.28I The failure of states to 
Constitution's Commerce Clause, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 149, 161 (2004) (discussing 
late nineteenth-century congressional debate about impending extinction of the 
great plains bison). 
276. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 3371-3378 (2000»; see Mank, supra note 5, at 773-74 (discussing Lacey Act as 
first step in process of creating national regime for protecting endangered spe-
cies); Mank, supra note 9, at 933 (same); White, supra note 5, at 221 (same); Pe-
tersen, supra note 274, at 469 (same). The Lacey Act now applies to all wild ani-
mals, including those bred in captivity, and to plants protected by treaty or state 
law. 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (discussing scope of the Act); see George Cameron Coggins & 
Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law: The Recent Evolution of 
Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247, 305-07 
(1987) (discussing 1981 Lacey Act Amendments). 
277. See 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (discussing scope of the Act); Mank, supra note 9, at 
933; Petersen, supra note 274, at 469. 
278. PETERSEN, supra note 275, at 9; Lowenberg, supra note 275, at 161-62. 
279. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712; Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 
435 (1920) (holding Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 constitutional under the 
Treaty Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 934 (same); Petersen, supra note 274, at 
469 (same). Great Britain signed the Treaty on behalf of Canada as overseer of 
Canadian foreign affairs. Petersen, supra note 274, at 469 n.52. 
280. See Bald Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 934; Petersen, 
supra note 274, at 470. 
281. Mank, supra note 5, at 776 (arguing states have not traditionally pro-
tected endangered species); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); White, supra note 
5, at 250-52 (arguing state regulation of endangered species is inadequate and 
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provide effective protection for these species and the advan-
tages of uniform national legislation eventually resulted in 
Congress's enactment of the ESA in 1973.282 In the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Congress: (1) recog-
nized that many states had failed to preserve these species; (2) 
explicitly authorized the Department of Interior to continue its 
practice of creating a list of endangered species; (3) created a 
National Wildlife Refuge System to prohibit the taking of listed 
endangered species living within federal lands; and (4) pro-
vided the government with authority to acquire additional fed-
eralland if necessary to accomplish preservation goals. How-
ever, the Act did not regulate private or state lands.283 The 
failure of the 1966 Act and the slightly broader Endangered 
Species Conservation Act of 1969284 to stop extinctions led to 
the far broader 1973 Act, which applies to all land in the 
United States and adds protection for threatened species.285 
The ESA recognizes that states and the federal govern-
ment have shared regulatory responsibilities in several ar-
federal government has greater expertise). 
282. The ESA's legislative history stated that federal regulation of endangered 
and threatened species was required to achieve uniform, national standards and 
that inconsistent state laws likely hindered the protection of these species: "Pro-
tection of endangered species is not a matter that can be handled in absence of 
coherent national and international policies[;] the results of a series of uncon-
nected and disorganized polices and programs by various states might well be con-
fusion compounded." H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973); see Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 
F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000) ("A desire for uniform standards also spurred en-
actment of the ESA."); Mank, supra note 5, at 779 (arguing both the inadequacy of 
state laws and desirability of national uniform regulation led Congress to enact 
1973 ESA); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000-01 (same). 
283. See Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966); PETERSEN, supra note 275, at 
471 (discussing the 1966 Act); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Seeing Red: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2002) (same); Mank, supra note 9, at 934-36 
(same); Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection 
of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 295-96 (1991) (same); Davina Kari 
Kaile, Note, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of 
the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 448-54 (1993) (same). 
284. See Pub. L. No. 91·135, § 2-3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969); PETERSEN, supra 
note 275, at 472 (discussing 1969 Act); Fitzgerald, supra note 283, at 30 (same); 
Mank, supra note 9, at 936 (same); Doremus, supra note 283, at 296-97 (same); 
Kaile, supra note 283, at 451-53 (same). 
285. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1538(a)(I) (2000); Fitzgerald, supra note 283, at 31 
(discussing 1973 Act); Mank, supra note 9, at 936-45 (same); Kaile, supra note 
283, at 454-56 (same and noting 1973 Act expanded beyond 1966 and 1969 Acts 
to include threatened species). 
434 UNNERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
eas.286 The ESA requires the Secretary of Interior to consider 
state efforts to preserve such species before any federal regula-
tion may be imposed.287 Also, the Act provides that the Secre-
tary may enter into cooperative programs with states that have 
adequate programs for conserving threatened and endangered 
species and may provide financial assistance for such pro-
grams.288 In Fiscal Year 2006, the federal government allo-
cated $82 million for Section 6 cooperative programs.289 Addi-
tionally, the ESA encourages the federal government to 
cooperate with states in acquiring land for these species.29o 
Furthermore, the ESA is limited because the government 
must review its listing decisions every five years to determine 
if a species is still endangered or threatened.291 Once a species 
"recovers" (in other words, is no longer endangered or threat-
ened), the federal government must return regulatory respon-
sibility for the species to the states.292 Thus, the ESA places 
limits on national authority that are consistent with the Con-
stitution's federalist structure and comport with Lopez and 
Morrison, as well as with Justice Scalia's interpretation of the 
286. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502-05; Mank, supra note 5, at 780-81; see also Robert 
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 101, 133-38 (2006) (discussing ESA's provisions for cooperative federalism 
and ways to improve them); Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall Rivera, A Lesson 
for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 80-89 (2002) 
(same); Mank, supra note 9, at 940-41,998-1000 (same). 
287. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(I)(A) (2000) (Secretary may list a species as endan-
gered or threatened only after reviewing "those efforts, if any, being made by any 
State ... to protect such species."); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503 (discussing 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(I)(A) (2000); Mank, supra note 9, at 999-1000; Mank, supra note 5, at 
78l. 
288. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(cHd) (2000); Mank, supra note 5, at 781; Mank, supra 
note 9, at 1000. 
289. Fischman, supra note 286, at 134. 
290. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000) (providing that the Secretary should acquire 
land in cooperation with the states). 
291. Id. § 1533(c)(2)(A)-(B) (requiring Secretary of Interior to revj.ew listed en-
dangered or threatened species at least once every five years to determine if they 
have recovered or require additional protection); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank, 
supra note 5, at 780-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 940, 993, 999. 
292. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000) (defining "conservation" as "the use of all 
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or 
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this 
chapter are no longer necessary"); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank, supra note 5, at 
780-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 940, 993, 999 (2004); Santaniello, supra note 268, 
at 53. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause as limited by that structure.293 
In SWANCC, the Court, in dicta, suggested that the govern-
ment's attempt to regulate all wetlands, including isolated, in-
trastate wetlands, raised serious constitutional concerns under 
the Commerce Clause, but the Court also stated that the gov-
ernment could regulate wetlands having a "significant nexus" 
to navigable waters.294 Thus, SWANCC suggested that limited 
government regulation of the environment with a rational con-
nection to interstate commerce is permissible. That is precisely 
what the narrowly tailored ESA does by regulating only those 
species at great risk whose extinction poses significant risks to 
ecosystems, biodiversity, our genetic heritage, future medical 
discoveries, agriculture, and ultimately the national economy, 
as Part C, infra, will demonstrate.295 
C. Aggregation of All Endangered Species Is Necessary 
and Proper 
Whether Congress may regulate individual threatened or 
endangered species that lack significant commercial value de-
pends on whether courts (1) allow Congress to aggregate the 
economic impact of all endangered species in measuring 
whether they have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce or (2) treat each species separately in determining such 
impacts. If Congress may aggregate the economic impacts of 
the takings of all endangered species, there undoubtedly would 
be substantial impacts on interstate commerce because some 
endangered species like the grizzly bear and bald eagle have 
significant recreational value in generating tourism.296 The 
crux of the issue is whether it is necessary and proper for Con-
gress to aggregate all endangered species.297 If the ESA is a 
293. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank, supra note 5, at 780-81; Mank, supra note 
9, at 940, 993, 999; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 53. 
294. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167-74 (2001). 
295. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text; infra notes 339-412 and 
accompanying text. 
296. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 632, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 
286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en bane), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); id. at 641-44 
(Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at 942, 965-69, 971, 980, 988--91, 
997-98; Mank, supra note 5, at 782-87,793-95; Nagle, supra note 5, at 184-86. 
297. Compare Mank, supra note 5, at 782-87, 793-95 (discussing aggregation 
principle under Commerce Clause and arguing that it is appropriate under Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to aggregate different endangered species to demonstrate 
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comprehensive regulatory scheme, then the fact that some spe-
cies lack commercial value does not prevent Congress from 
regulating them to achieve the Act's legitimate commercial 
purposes.298 Conversely, if it is inappropriate to aggregate dif-
ferent endangered species because each species has its own 
unique impact on interstate commerce, then Congress would 
have the authority to regulate and protect only those endan-
gered species that possess significant commercial value.299 
In the statute, Congress stated that the ESA is necessary 
to protect interstate commerce because "species of fish, wildlife, 
and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its peo-
ple."300 The ecological value of endangered species refers to the 
role that animals and plants play in promoting air and water 
quality, regulating the climate, removing unwanted pests, cre-
ating and protecting soil, controlling floods and droughts, polli-
nating crops, protecting the earth from ultraviolet rays, and 
dispersing seeds and nutrients.301 Endangered plants and 
animals are a present and future important source of drugs 
and other medical treatments.302 Additionally, ecotourism ac-
counts for billions of dollars annually.303 Clearly, endangered 
and threatened species in the aggregate have significant com-
mercial value, but that leaves open the question of whether 
substantial impacts on interstate commerce), and Mank, supra note 9, at 942, 
965-69, 971, 980, 988-91, 997-98 (same), with Nagle, supra note 5, at 180, 193-
202 (discussing aggregation principle under Commerce Clause and arguing that it 
is inappropriate under Necessary and Proper Clause to aggregate different en-
dangered species to demonstrate substantial impacts on interstate commerce). 
298. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; id. at 641-44 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, 
supra note 9, at 942, 965-69, 971, 980, 988-91, 997-98; Mank, supra note 5, at 
782-87, 793-95; Nagle, supra note 5, at 200 (discussing argument that ESA is 
valid under Necessary and Proper Clause). 
299. See Nagle, supra note 5, at 180, 193-202 (discussing aggregation principle 
under Commerce Clause and arguing that it is inappropriate to aggregate differ-
ent endangered species to demonstrate substantial impacts on interstate com-
merce); see id. at 186-89 (questioning ecosystem and biodiversity arguments that 
loss of even commercially insignificant endangered species is likely to have sub-
stantial adverse economic impacts and suggesting more proof of economic harm is 
required to justify the ESA under the Commerce Clause). But see Mank, supra 
note 5, at 782-87, 793-95 (discussing aggregation principle under Commerce 
Clause and disagreeing with argument that it is inappropriate to aggregate dif-
ferent endangered species); Mank, supra note 9, at 988, 997 (same). 
300. 16 U.s.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2000). 
301. Nagle, supra note 5, at 184. 
302. Id. 
303. Id 
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Congress has authority to protect species with little commercial 
value. 
Professor Nagle argues that Wickard does not support the 
aggregation of all endangered species because, although it is 
appropriate to aggregate a single commodity such as wheat, it 
is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species that 
widely differ in their biological forms, their ecosystems, and 
their economic value to interstate commerce.304 In arguing 
that it is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered spe-
cies, he points out that the Wickard court aggregated "all 
wheat grown by farmers for their personal use," but that the 
court did not aggregate all the different crops grown by farmers 
for their personal use.305 Furthermore, he argues that the ag-
gregation of wheat in Wickard was more justified under the 
commerce power because the consumption of homegrown wheat 
by a farmer directly and substantially affected interstate com-
merce; in contrast, the extinction of some endangered animals 
with no commercial economic value would not impact com-
merce.306 Accordingly, Professor Nagle suggests that it is in-
appropriate to aggregate all endangered species because many 
such species lack any substantial connection to or impact on in-
terstate commerce.307 Additionally, he suggests that the Lopez 
decision raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of ag-
gregating noncommercial species with commercially valuable 
species because the Court implied that it was usually inappro-
priate for Congress to broadly aggregate non-economic activi-
ties as a way to demonstrate that such activities nevertheless 
had substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 308 Although 
he acknowledges that courts have used a broad construction of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize Congress to 
regulate commercial activities that may include a few inciden-
tal activities without economic value, Professor Nagle argues 
that it is inappropriate for courts to aggregate a large number 
of commercially valueless species with commercially valuable 
304. Id. at 193-95; Mank, supra note 5, at 784 (discussing and critiquing Pro-
fessor Nagle's argument that it is inappropriate to aggregate all endangered spe-
cies because they are too dissimilar); Mank, supra note 9, at 997 (same). 
305. Nagle, supra note 5, at 194; Mank, supra note 5, at 784. 
306. Nagle, supra note 5, at 195; Mank, supra note 5, at 784. 
307. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197; Mank, supra note 5, at 784. 
308. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197; Mank, supra note 5, at 785; Mank, supra note 
9, at 997. 
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ones.309 He suggests that Congress may aggregate commer-
cially valueless species with species that substantially affect 
interstate commerce only if those species are substantially 
similar in form, habitat, relationship, or some other significant 
factor. 3 10 
The subsequent Raich decision weakens Professor Nagle's 
argument. If he wrote an article revisiting the subject in light 
of Raich, Professor Nagle could argue that Raich does not un-
dermine his argument because the case involved a single com-
modity, marijuana. Nevertheless, Raich calls into question at 
least some of his argument because the Court and Justice 
Scalia's concurring opinion upheld congressional regulation of a 
noncommercial intrastate activity-medical marijuana use un-
der state law-as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme.311 
Thus, the Court and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion author-
ized Congress, in at least some circumstances, to aggregate 
noncommercial intrastate activities with commercially valuable 
activities. In reviewing a comprehensive statutory scheme, 
both the Raich Court and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion 
implicitly placed the burden on the petitioners to explain why 
it was impermissible for Congress to aggregate noncommercial 
activities with commercially valuable activities.312 If Congress 
can aggregate intrastate medical marijuana with commercial 
recreational use of the drug, then there is a rational basis for 
aggregating intrastate species with interstate species, or non-
commercial species with commercially valuable species, espe-
cially because these species are often part of complex, inde-
pendent ecosystems.313 
The question of whether it is appropriate to aggregate all 
endangered and threatened species depends upon Congress's 
purpose for protecting them through the ESA.314 There are 
309. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197-202 (discussing and quoting United States v. 
Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[I]f a statute regulates an activity 
which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial affect [sic] on interstate 
commerce ... 'the de minimis character of individual instances arising under the 
statute is of no consequence."'»; see also Mank, supra note 5, at 785. 
310. Nagle, supra note 5, at 193-202; Mank, supra note 5, at 784-85. 
311. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-13 (2005); id., at 2216-19 
(Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 163, 167, 181, 201-02, 214-17 and accompa-
nying text. 
312. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra 
notes 164, 176-77, 181,226-28 and accompanying text. 
313. See infra notes 344-45,361,367,371-72 and accompanying text. 
314. Mank, supra note 5, at 785. 
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four reasons that Congress might aggregate all threatened and 
endangered species as part of a comprehensive statute that 
better protects the commercial value of these species than a 
more limited statute. First, Congress needed to provide uni-
form standards for protecting all threatened and endangered 
species to prevent a race to the bottom by states that may be 
tempted to lower their standards to promote economic devel-
opment.315 Second, Congress sought to preserve biodiversity by 
protecting all threatened and endangered species because 
many apparently obscure species are in fact essential to the 
workings of their ecosystems. Furthermore, different species 
often interact in such complex ways that the loss of apparently 
"valueless" species may affect commercially valuable species.316 
There is significant evidence that the environment is more 
valuable to interstate commerce if there are more species in the 
ecosystem.317 Third, there is a rational argument that Con-
gress could consider the potential future economic value of all 
endangered or threatened species in determining that it is nec-
essary and proper to regulate all such species and not just 
those that have substantial economic impacts today on inter-
state commerce.318 Fourth, and most importantly, courts 
should defer to legislative findings in the ESA that rely on the 
uniformity, biodiversity, and future benefits arguments be-
cause each justification strengthens the case that the ESA is a 
comprehensive scheme that depends upon protecting all 
threatened and endangered species to maximize the total value 
of these species to the national economy and to promote inter-
315. See infra notes 321-38 and accompanying text. 
316. See GDF, 326 F.3d 622,640 (5th Cir. 2003) (arguing ESA aims to promote 
biodiversity as a means to assist interstate commerce), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 286 
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. 
Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same), reh'g denied, 334 F.3d 1158 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (U.S. 2004); Blumm & Kin-
drell, supra note 10, at 330-31, 353-54; Mank, supra note 5, at 785-87; Mank, 
supra note 9, at 989-93,997-98; see infra notes 344-45, 361, 367, 371-72 and ac-
companying text. 
317. See Blumm & Kindrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at 
785-87; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-93, 997-98; Nagle, supra note 5, at 188-89 & 
n.59 (observing that the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly may have significant eco-
nomic impacts on foods that are pollinated, such as "cashews, squash, mangos, 
cardamom, cacao, cranberries, and highbush blueberries") (internal citations 
omitted); see infra notes 355-57 accompanying text. 
318. Mank, supra note 5, at 785, 787-92; see infra notes 377-90 and accompa-
nying text. 
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state commerce.319 As part of the ESA's comprehensive 
scheme, Congress has the authority to aggregate all threatened 
and endangered species as necessary and proper to secure their 
protection and protect their value in interstate commerce.320 
1. National Uniform Regulation and Preventing a 
Race to the Bottom 
There is a strong argument that federal regulation of en-
dangered and threatened species is necessary to prevent a 
"race to the bottom" among states engaged in over-exploitation 
of their resources to compete with other states.321 For example, 
states might loosen standards for developing land or harvesting 
timber that could destroy critical habitat necessary for some 
endangered and threatened species.322 Furthermore, piece-
meal state regulation is less likely to be effective than federal 
319. See infra notes 391-412 and accompanying text. 
320. Mank, supra note 5, at 785, 792-93; see infra notes 391-412 and accom-
panying text. 
321. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000); Bradley C. Kark-
kainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1,73-76 (1997) (arguing fed-
eral regulation is superior to state regulation of ecosystems because of incentives 
for states to over exploit resources); Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80 (same); Max-
well L. Stearns, Crops, Guns & Commerce: A Game Theoretical Critique of Gonza-
les v. Raich 31-33 (Geo. Mason U. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
37, 2005) (arguing game theory predicts states will under-protect endangered spe-
cies compared to federal regulation), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1036&context=gmulwps; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 53; 
Van 'Loh, supra note 80, at 483; Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86 (presenting em-
pirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom" among states regulating surface-
mining). But see Lowenberg, supra note 275, at 191-93 (arguing states and local 
governments are capable of addressing environmental problems, including pro-
tecting threatened and endangered species). 
322. Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 74-75. 
Despite biodiversity's global benefits, many biodiversity-rich landowners, 
communities, and states will calculate that they will be better off exter-
nalizing the costs of biodiversity by letting local land conversion and de-
velopment proceed apace, while leaving the costs of conservation to oth-
ers. Indeed, states and communities with the largest inventories of 
undisturbed habitat and ecosystems are probably the least inclined to 
protect them for two reasons. First, from a local perspective, these lands 
may appear to be an overabundant resource. Second, these localities may 
be reluctant to protect these resources because they would carry a dis-
proportionate share of the localized costs of conservation if they must 
forego development on a disproportionate percentage of their lands. 
Jd.; Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483. 
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regulation.323 The House of Representatives Report on the 
1973 ESA specifically justified the statute as necessary because 
state efforts had been and were likely to continue to be ineffec-
tive, stating, "protection of endangered species is not a matter 
that can be handled in the absence of coherent national and in-
ternational policies: the results of a series of unconnected and 
disorganized policies and programs by various states might 
well be confusion compounded."324 Additionally, in Gibbs u. 
Babbitt,325 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the uniform stan-
dards of the ESA enhance interstate commerce by avoiding con-
flicting state standards.326 
In Hodel u. Virginia Surface Mining,327 the Court approved 
federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) be-
cause the absence of federal legislation would likely lead to ru-
inous competition among states, lowering each state's 
environmental standards in order to retain or attract busi-
nesses from other states.328 In approving federal regulation of 
intrastate mining operations, the Court stated, "The prevention 
of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional 
role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause."329 
Some commentators suggest that the framers of the Constitu-
tion would have approved of congressional legislation-based 
on the Commerce Clause-designed to prevent harmful na-
tional competition that states are unable to regulate effec-
tively.330 In National Ass'n of Home Builders u. Babbitt 
(NAHB),331 Judge Wald argued that Hodel u. Virginia Surface 
323. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501-02; Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80; Stearns, 
supra note 321, at 31-33; Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483. 
324. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412 , at 7 (1973); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502; Mank, suo 
pra note 5, at 779. 
325. 214 F.3d 483. 
326. Id. at 502; Mank, supra note 5, at 779. 
327. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
328. Id. at 281-82 (observing congressional concern that such competition 
among states would prevent "adequate standards on coal mining operations 
within their borders."); Mank, supra note 5, at 777; Mank supra note 9, at 947; 
Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86 (presenting empirical evidence supporting "race· 
to-the-bottom" among states regulating surface-mining). 
329. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 282. 
330. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 
''Race'' and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 281-82 (1997); Mank, 
supra note 5, at 778. 
331. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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Mining's rationale that Congress has authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities to prevent 
destructive interstate competition was a persuasive ground for 
justifying congressional regulation of endangered species under 
the ESA.332 Because a number of states do not possess effec-
tive regulatory schemes to protect endangered species, the Ho-
del v. Virginia Surface Mining decision supports an interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause that Congress may protect 
intrastate endangered species lacking significant value in in-
terstate commerce to prevent significant under-regulation of 
these species by the states.333 
Although it does not specifically address the issue of de-
structive interstate competition that was the focus of SMCRA, 
the ESA's legislative history does indicate that Congress 
wanted uniform federal standards because different state stan-
dards would likely lead to ineffective protection of endangered 
species.334 Most of the benefits of biodiversity are national in 
scope rather than local, including the value of drugs derived 
from plants and animals, agricultural products, and the insur-
ance value that healthy ecosystems provide against the possi-
bility of catastrophic natural disasters.335 Uniform federal 
standards under the ESA likely protect endangered or threat-
332. The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and the case at 
hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface Mining Act both regulate activities-
destruction of endangered species and destruction of the natural landscape-that 
are carried out entirely within a State and which are not themselves commercial 
in character. The activities, however, may be regulated because they have de-
structive effects, on environmental quality in one case and on the availability of a 
variety of species in the other, that are likely to affect more than one State. In 
each case, moreover, interstate competition provides incentives to states to adopt 
lower standards to gain an advantage vis-a-vis other states: in Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining the states were motivated to adopt lower environmental stan-
dards to improve the competitiveness of their coal production facilities, and in this 
case, the states are motivated to adopt lower standards of endangered species pro-
tection in order to attract development. [d. at 1055 (citations and footnote omit-
ted); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 328 n.122, 354; Mank, supra note 5, at 
777-78; Mank, supra note 9, at 947-48; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 48. 
333. See Mank, supra note 5, at 777-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 1001; Santa-
niello, supra note 268, at 53; supra notes 321-32 and accompanying text. 
334. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973)("[Pjrotection of endangered species 
is not a matter that can be handled in [thej absence of coherent national and in-
ternational policies: the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized poli-
cies and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded."); Gibbs 
v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "[aj desire for uniform 
standards also spurred enactment of the ESA."); Mank, supra note 5, at 779. 
335. Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 73-74. 
2007] AFTER RAJCH: IS THE ESA CONSTITUTIONAL? 443 
ened species far more effectively than state regulation, both be-
cause of the advantages of federal uniformity and because 
many states lack adequate programs for biodiversity and habi-
tat protection.336 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs de-
termined that the ESA's uniform standards facilitate interstate 
commerce by preempting conflicting state standards.337 Addi-
tionally, in the absence of the ESA, there is a significant risk 
that at least some states would race to the bottom to exploit 
timber or develop land and would destroy critical habitat cur-
rently protected by the ESA leading to the extinction of some 
valuable endangered or threatened species.338 For all of these 
reasons, the Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining precedent sup-
ports Congress's authority to regulate endangered or threat-
ened species in order to prevent the harms to the environment 
and nature that would occur in the absence of comprehensive 
federal legislation. 
2. Protecting Biodiversity 
The ESA's legislative history emphasized the importance 
of protecting endangered or threatened species as a means to 
preserve biodiversity, which refers to ecosystems containing a 
wide range and sufficient number of often interdependent spe-
cies that enhance the overall health of the ecosystem.339 In 
NAHB, Judge Wald argued that the ESA's policy of protecting 
biodiversity provides substantial benefits to interstate com-
336. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 336 (reporting Gibbs's court 
conclusion that eliminating federal regulation of endangered species would 
weaken their protection); Mank, supra note 9, at 779-80 (arguing federal govern-
ment has greater expertise than states in environmental protection and wildlife 
conservation); Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 73-76 (arguing federal regulation 
is superior to state regulation of ecosystems because of incentives for states to 
over exploit resources); White, supra note 5, at 250-52 (same). 
337. 214 F.3d at 502; Mank, supra note 5, at 779. 
338. Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483; see also Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86 
(presenting empirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom" among states 
regulating surface-mining, but acknowledging other areas of environmental regu-
lation may not lead to such a race). 
339. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) (stressing importance of preserving 
our "genetic heritage"); See NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[O]ne of 
the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from 
'takings' was the importance of [the] continuing availability of a wide variety of 
species to interstate commerce."); Mank, supra note 5, at 729, 786-87 (discussing 
legislative findings in 1973 ESA justifying preservation of biodiversity and spe-
cies' genetic material); Van Loh, supra note 80, at 484-85 (same). 
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merce by preserving a large number and wide range of differ-
ent animal and plant species.34o Current scientific data sup-
ported congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative his-
tory that "'taking[s]' [of endangered species] ... would have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce by depriving com-
mercial actors of access to an important natural resource-
biodiversity."341 
There is a strong biodiversity argument for preserving 
commercially insignificant endangered species that may affect 
other species and entire ecosystems that do have significant 
impacts on interstate commerce. In NAHB, Judge Henderson 
concurred because she did not agree with Judge Wald's argu-
ment that potential future medicinal or economic benefits from 
preserving biodiversity loss justified Commerce Clause regula-
tion; in her view, these potential future impacts were too un-
certain.342 Instead, Judge Henderson argued that Congress 
had the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an 
obscure endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly that only 
lived in a small area in California and had no apparent eco-
nomic value because "the loss of biodiversity itself has a sub-
stantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate com-
merce."343 She claimed that because of "the interconnectedness 
of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
extinction of one species affects others and their ecosystems 
and that the protection of a purely intrastate species ... will 
therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved 
in interstate commerce."344 Thus, she contended that the ESA 
may reach commercially insignificant species because there is a 
340. 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Blumm & Kimbrell, su-
pra note 10, at 329-30; Mank, supra note 9, at 986. 
341. NAHB,130 F.3d at 1053-54 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Blumm & Kim· 
brell, supra note 10, at 329-31; Mank, supra note 9, at 986. 
342. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kim-
brell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at 758; Santaniello, supra 
note 268, at 48-49. 
343. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring); Mank, supra 
note 5, at 758, 786. Judge Henderson concurred because she did not agree with 
Judge Wald's argument that potential future medicinal or economic benefits from 
preserving biodiversity loss justified Commerce Clause regulation; Judge Hender-
son argued these potential future impacts were too uncertain. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 
1058 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; 
Mank, supra note 5, at 758-59, 786. 
344. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, 
supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at 758-59, 786. 
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rational basis for Congress's assumption in the statute that 
their extinction could harm more commercially valuable species 
and, therefore, that their extinction could substantially affect 
interstate commerce.345 Judge Henderson, however, failed to 
provide any specific evidence regarding how the extinction of 
the fly might affect other species or substantially affect inter-
state commerce.346 
Although Professor Nagle argues that the biodiversity ar-
guments for aggregation suggested by Judge Wald and Judge 
Henderson go too far because their reasoning would justify an 
"Earth Preservation Act" forbidding harm to any natural ob-
jects of the earth,347 he fails to address adequately the more 
limited nature of the ESA. The ESA is restricted to protecting 
only those species that are threatened and endangered rather 
than all species.348 Furthermore, the ESA returns control of 
species to states as soon as the species has recovered and is no 
longer threatened or endangered.349 
The ESA complies with even the narrow approach to fed-
eralism of Lopez and Morrison because the statute contains an 
appropriate "limiting principle" as it applies to species only so 
long as they are threatened or endangered. In GDF, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that interpreting the Commerce Clause to 
authorize Congress to regulate all threatened and endangered 
species does not interfere with a traditional area of state regu-
lation because regulation of endangered species is a shared 
subject of national interest.35o Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the ESA's limited regulation of only endangered 
345. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 549, 557-59); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra 
note 5, at 759, 786. 
346. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing Judge 
Henderson's biodiversity and ecosystem protection arguments for validity of regu-
lating fly failed to meet Supreme Court's requirement in Lopez that regulation 
must substantially affect commercial concerns); Mank, supra note 5, at 759-60; 
but see Nagle, supra note 5, at 188--89 & n.59 (observing that Delhi Sands flower-
loving fly may have significant economic impacts on foods that are pollinated, 
such as "cashews, squash, mangos, cardamon, cacao, cranberries, and highbush 
blueberries"). 
347. Nagle, supra note 5, at 198--99; Mank, supra note 5, at 787. 
348. See Mank, supra note 5, at 787; supra notes 253-54, 282, 285, 291-92 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text. 
349. See Mank, supra note 5, at 787; supra notes 291-93 and accompanying 
text. 
350. 326 F.3d 622, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2003); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, 
at 336, 340, 344-45, 353; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90. 
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or threatened species, as opposed to all other species, comports 
with the statement in Lopez and Morrison that congressional 
legislation is more likely to be valid under the Commerce 
Clause if a statute has a limiting principle.351 The GDF court 
determined that an appropriate limiting principle existed be-
cause the statute is limited to endangered species that would 
likely be affected by a small number of takes, and does not ap-
ply to abundant species.352 Because of the ESA's limitation of 
its authority to only threatened and endangered species and its 
requirement that "recovered" species must return to state regu-
lation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ESA "will not allow 
Congress to regulate general land use or wildlife preserva-
tion."353 
The ESA's policy of preserving biodiversity meets the 
Court's substantial-effects-on -interstate-commerce standard for 
the Commerce Clause because the ESA produces significant 
current economic benefits to interstate commerce.354 Because 
preserving genetic diversity may lessen the spread of diseases, 
protect food sources, and provide medicines, the ESA's policy of 
preserving biodiversity by protecting all threatened and en-
dangered species-not just those that have direct commercial 
value-is a rational policy that sufficiently promotes the eco-
nomic value of interstate commerce to be constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause.355 For example, there is some scientific 
evidence that more biologically diverse ecosystems and wildlife 
populations are less prone to catastrophic diseases or pests.356 
Accordingly, preserving the diversity of plants and animals is 
351. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598,612-13 (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 990. 
352. 326 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13); Mank, su-
pra note 9, at 990. 
353. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995» ('We rejected these ... argu-
ments because they would permit Congress to 'regulate not only all violent crime, 
but all activities that might lead to violent crime .... "'», reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 
286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Mank, supra note 
9, at 989-90, 998-99. 
354. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, su-
pra note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788. 
355. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, su-
pra note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788. But see Lowenberg, supra 
note 275, at 185 (arguing only small percentage of species have useful genetic 
compounds). 
356. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, supra 
note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788. 
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advantageous for securing reliable sources of food for human 
beings because over-reliance on a few crops makes them more 
vulnerable to disease or pests.357 
Furthermore, plants and animals are sources of chemicals 
and raw materials for many commercial products.358 For in-
stance, about half of all the drugs used in medicine are derived 
from plants or animals, including several endangered species, 
with a total value of billions of dollars every year.359 Further-
more, many species that lack individual commercial value per-
form important "ecosystem services" by decomposing organic 
matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air or water, 
or limiting destructive climatic variation.36o In many in-
stances, the loss of endangered species that have little direct 
commercial value in interstate commerce would adversely im-
pact other species, both endangered and abundant, that have 
significant commercial value. Thus, the extinction of many 
commercially valueless endangered species would have a sub-
stantial impact on interstate commerce.361 In Gibbs, the 
357. Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 253-55 (discussing crop composition 
of human diets); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; Nagle, supra note 5, at 185 (stating 
American farmers use genes from wild plant species in producing nearly $1 billion 
of crops). 
358. NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., plurality opin-
ion) (observing that plant genetic resources contributed to the "explosive growth 
in farm production" during the twentieth century); EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DI-
VERSITY OF LIFE 281-310 (W.W. Norton 1999) (1992) (discussing medical and 
commercial value of several species, including endangered Zea diploperennis, a 
relative of corn with possible agricultural value; and Catharanthus roseus, rosy 
periwinkle, used to treat cancer); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31 & 
n.128; Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 256-57 (providing examples of plants 
used in business and industry); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; McKibbin, supra note 
256, at 24-25 (,'The biodiversity literature abounds with examples of near-extinct 
species found, in the nick of time, to have useful pharmaceutical and agricultural 
properties."). 
359. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (observing that 
50% of the most frequently prescribed medicines are derived from wild plant and 
animal species; those medicines had a 1983 value in excess of $15 billion a year); 
Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31 & n.128; Coggins & Harris, supra 
note 276, at 255-56 (discussing role of plants in medicine); John Charles Kunich, 
Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 HAsT-
INGS L.J. 1149, 1163-64 (2001) (stating total value of drugs derived from wild or-
ganisms is $14 billion per year); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; Nagle, supra note 5, 
at 185 (noting plants are being studied to find cure for AIDS); White, supra note 
5, at 243-47 (discussing use of plants as sources of chemotherapy drugs). 
360. Kunich, supra note 359, at 1164-65; Mank, supra note 9, at 989; Mank, 
supra note 5, at 786. 
361. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Kunich, supra note 358, 
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Fourth Circuit concluded that "it is simply not beyond the 
power of Congress to conclude that a healthy environment ac-
tually boosts industry by allowing commercial development of 
our national resources."362 
Because the ESA's policy of preserving as many endan-
gered and threatened species as possible substantially affects 
interstate commerce by promoting biodiversity, courts should 
conclude that the ESA's aggregation of all endangered and 
threatened species is a necessary and proper means of the con-
gressional commerce power.363 In TVA v. Hill,364 the Supreme 
Court recognized the congressional goal of using the ESA to 
protect ecosystems when it stated that in enacting the ESA in 
1973, "Congress was concerned [not only] about the unknown 
uses that endangered species might have[, but also] ... about 
the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of 
life on this planet."365 In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that "Congress is entitled to make the judgment that conserva-
tion is potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be pres-
ently ascertained."366 Because commercially insignificant spe-
cies often have important effects on commercially valuable 
species and ecosystems, the Fifth Circuit agreed that, despite 
the absence of an express jurisdictional element in the statute, 
"the ESA's take provision is limited to instances which 'have an 
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."'367 
In Rancho Viejo, the District of Columbia Circuit held that 
Congress could justify the ESA in part on the non-economic 
goal of preserving biodiversity because the Commerce Clause 
authorizes statutes to have multiple purposes as long as eco-
nomic regulation is a significant component of the legislation. 
It also held that Congress could regulate large commercial de-
velopment with significant impacts on interstate commerce 
at 1164-65 (discussing numerous benefits both apparent and less visible created 
by living species); Mank, supra note 5, at 786. 
362. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 496 (4th Cir. 2000). 
363. Mank, supra note 5, at 786-87; see also Kunich, supra note 358, at 1164-
65 (discussing ecosystem benefits created by having wide variety of living species). 
364. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
365. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis in original); accord Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496; Mank, 
supra note 9, at 997; Mank, supra note 5, at 789-90. 
366. 214 F.3d at 496; Mank, supra note 5, at 789-90. 
367. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 997. 
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that would destroy the critical habitat of threatened or endan-
gered species.368 
In his concurring opinion in GDF, Judge Dennis relied on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in arguing that the ESA's 
regulation of commercially insignificant species was constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause because the Supreme Court 
had recognized since the Darby decision in 1941 that ''both 
commercial and noncommercial activity may be regulated by 
Congress if the regulation is an essential or integral part of a 
larger comprehensive scheme properly regulating activity sub-
stantially affecting interstate commerce."369 He argued that 
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to pro-
tect noncommercial, intrastate endangered species as an essen-
tial means of protecting commercially valuable ecosystems and 
species that have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce.370 Although there are legitimate questions about 
whether all endangered or threatened species are in fact essen-
tial for preserving commercially valuable species or ecosystems, 
Judge Dennis argued that courts should defer to the ESA's 
comprehensive statutory scheme because "[t]he interrelation-
ship of commercial and noncommercial species is so compli-
cated, intertwined, and not yet fully understood that Congress 
acted rationally in seeking to protect all endangered or threat-
ened species from extinction or harm."371 Recognizing these 
complex interrelationships, he concluded that it is appropriate 
for Congress, in the ESA, to aggregate the impact of all takes of 
368. 323 F.3d 1062, 1073-76 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Mank, supra note 9, at 
976-77. 
369. GDF, 326 F.3d at 642-43 (Dennis, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, su-
pra note 10, at 341; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 496 (arguing Judge 
Dennis' concurrence in GDF "emphasized that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
supported the ESA's constitutionality as a comprehensive scheme, of which the 
regulation of species takes is an essential part."); Mank, supra note 9, at 990. 
370. GDF, 326 F.3d at 641 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at 
990-91. 
371. GDF, 326 F.3d at 643-44 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at 
991. Given the limitations of scientific knowledge, it is unrealistic for a court to 
try to determine if a specific species has significant value to an ecosystem and, in 
turn, to interstate commerce. See generally Jamie Murphy, The Quiet Apocalypse, 
TIME, Oct. 13, 1986, at 80 (quoting Edward O. Wilson: "[W]e don't know for sure 
how many species there are, where they can be found or how fast they're disap-
pearing. It's like having astronomy without knowing where the stars are."); WIL· 
SON, supra note 358, at 308 (stating that science cannot provide reliable estimates 
of the value of species). 
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endangered species because "the regulation is necessary and 
proper to ... the ESA's comprehensive scheme to preserve the 
nation's genetic heritage and the 'incalculable' value inherent 
to that scarce natural resource, and because that regulatory 
scheme has a very substantial impact on interstate com-
merce."372 Judge Dennis made the strongest case that there 
was a rational basis for Congress to protect all endangered or 
threatened species for biodiversity benefits when he empha-
sized that preserving biodiversity was a central part of the 
ESA's comprehensive scheme of protection and that Congress 
had authority to preserve biodiversity under both the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 373 The 
Gibbs, Rancho Viejo, and GDF decisions, as well as Judge 
Wald's opinion in NAHB and Judge Henderson's concurring 
opinion in NAHB, made strong arguments in favor of a biodi-
versity justification for the ESA's protection of all endangered 
or threatened species under the Commerce Clause. 
The Raich opinion's deferential approach for reviewing 
congressional findings provides a strong rationale for conclud-
ing that courts should defer to the congressional findings in the 
ESA about the need to preserve endangered and threatened 
species as a way to preserve biodiversity and sensitive ecosys-
tems.374 Under Raich's deferential standard for reviewing con-
gressional findings of fact, Congress in the 1973 ESA more 
than adequately justified the statute as a means of preserving 
the benefits of biodiversity even if science still does not fully 
understand all of these benefits.375 
372. GDF, 326 F.3d at 644 (Dennis, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Tiefer, Af-
ter Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from Commerce Clause 
Challenge?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,888 (Sept. 2000»; Mank, supra 
note 9, at 99l. 
373. See GDF, 326 F.3d at 642-43 (Dennis, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, 
supra note 14, at 496 (arguing Judge Dennis' concurrence in GDF "emphasized 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause supported the ESA's constitutionality as a 
comprehensive scheme, of which the regulation of species takes is an essential 
part."); Mank, supra note 9, at 990; supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text. 
374. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201-15 (2005); id. at 2219-20 (Scalia, 
J., concurring); supra notes 158, 175-76, 181, 187, 226-28 and accompanying text. 
375. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 ("[wle have never required Congress to make 
particularized findings in order to legislate absent a special concern such as the 
protection of free speech." (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 
(1995»). 
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3. Future Economic Benefits 
There is a strong argument that courts should defer to 
Congress's rational argument that it is appropriate to preserve 
all endangered or threatened species because it is impossible to 
know which species may have important economic or social 
benefits in the future. Congress may consider the potential fu-
ture economic value of endangered and threatened species in 
determining that it is necessary and proper to regulate all such 
species and not just those that have substantial economic im-
pacts on interstate commerce today. In the 1973 ESA's legisla-
tive history, Congress emphasized the potential future eco-
nomic and medical benefits of preserving a wide variety of 
species and genetic heritage.376 The House Report explained 
that it was essential to preserve endangered species because 
the value of their "genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalcula-
ble": 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or 
other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the 
structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much 
less analyzed? More to the point, who is prepared to risk be-
ing [sic] those potential cures by eliminating those plants 
for all time? Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.377 
376. Mank, supra note 9, at 938-39; Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30; infra notes 
377-84, 387-90 and accompanying text. 
377. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the 
1969 ESA noted: 
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species 
of wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of 
that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be 
resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and 
marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where oth-
erwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial chan-
nels in a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, however, is 
the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool 
... available for use by man in future years. Since each living species 
and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the diffi-
culty of living in the world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinc-
tive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to man-
kind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease 
or environmental contaminants, is also irretrievably lost. 
S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415. 
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The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs and Judge Wald of the District 
of Columbia Circuit in NAHB have stated that courts should 
defer to these congressional findings about the future value of 
endangered species, even if those benefits could not be pre-
cisely calculated.378 The Fourth Circuit stated that the Su-
preme Court has traditionally deferred to congressional find-
ings that regulation may produce economic or other benefits in 
the future as long as there is a rational basis for such legisla-
tive findings. 379 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Con-
gress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an 
endangered or threatened species because the species could 
have a substantial economic impact on interstate commerce in 
the future, even if that species has no current impact on inter-
state commerce.380 
Judge Wald argued that it was appropriate to aggregate 
together all endangered species in assessing their economic 
impact on interstate commerce because the ESA produces sig-
nificant current and future economic benefits to interstate 
commerce by preserving genetic diversity and conserving ge-
netic resources that may have future medical value.381 She 
contended that each time a species becomes extinct and the 
pool of wild species decreases, the extinction "has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural re-
source that could otherwise be used for present and future 
commercial purposes."382 She acknowledged that the full value 
of many plants and animals is uncertain but nonetheless con-
cluded that each endangered species is entitled to protection 
because "[a] species whose worth is still unmeasured has what 
economists call an 'option value'-the value of the possibility 
that a future discovery will make useful a species that is cur-
378. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 496-98 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing 1973 
ESA's legislative history's focus on future economic and medical benefits and ar· 
guing that concern for future economic benefits was appropriate basis for congres-
sional regulation under Commerce Clause); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-54 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (same); Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30, 
756-57, 766, 782-92 (arguing legislative concern for future economic benefits in 
1973 ESA's legislative history was appropriate basis for national regulation under 
Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 938-39, 967 (same). 
379. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-97; Mank, supra note 5, at 766. 
380. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496; Mank, supra note 5, at 766. 
381. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra 
note 5, at 756-57; Mank, supra note 9, at 967. 
382. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5, 
at 756; Mank, supra note 9, at 967. 
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rently thought of as useless."383 She argued that "[t]o allow 
even a single species whose value is not currently apparent to 
become extinct therefore deprives the economy of the option 
value of that species."384 Conversely, the Fifth Circuit and 
other judges on the District of Columbia Circuit have criticized 
the potential future uses rationale for justifying congressional 
regulation under the Commerce Clause because that methodol-
ogy would allow Congress to regulate any endangered species 
no matter how attenuated its relationship to interstate com-
merce or how speculative its future value to society.385 
Following the Raich Court's deferential approach to con-
gressional findings, courts should defer to Congress's rational 
finding that all endangered and threatened species should be 
preserved because of their potentially irreplaceable future 
benefits that society could otherwise lose forever. In Raich, the 
Court deferred to congressional findings that regulating intra-
state markets in marijuana was an essential component in 
regulating the national market in the drug, but the Court also 
stated that the absence of particular congressional findings re-
garding medical marijuana use did not "call into question Con-
gress's authority to legislate."386 Accordingly under Raich, the 
ESA's general findings about the importance of preserving bio-
383. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5, 
at 756-57; Mank, supra note 9, at 967. In one study, two scholars estimated that 
the option value, or economic value of biodiversity, for the entire world was be-
tween $16 and $54 trillion per year, with an average value of $33 trillion, which is 
roughly double the annual global national product. KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. 
LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY: ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES 
AND BENEFIT SHARING 3 (1999). 
384. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5, 
at 757; Mank, supra note 9, at 967. 
385. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The possibility of future sub· 
stantial effects of the Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries 
such as medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the regulation in 
question to pass constitutional muster." (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 612 (2000»; NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring) 
(criticizing Judge Wald's aggregation of all endangered species on biodiversity and 
future medical uses grounds because value of many species is too speculative); id. 
at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (same); Akins, supra note 27, at 181 (criticizing 
Judge Wald's aggregation of all endangered species because the "connection be-
tween the regulated activity and interstate commerce is too attenuated"); Nagle, 
supra note 5, at 183-84 (same); see also Mank, supra note 5, at 757 (discussing 
criticism of using potential future value of all endangered species to justify con-
gressional regulation under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 967, 
988 (same). 
386. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005). 
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diversity and preserving our genetic heritage for future genera-
tions are sufficient even though Congress did not make particu-
larized findings about the value of specific species. Because 
some commercially insignificant species likely will have value 
in the future, it was rational for Congress to protect all endan-
gered and threatened species.387 There is a good argument 
that it is safer to preserve as many species as possible because 
one can never be sure whether a species could be useful in the 
future. 388 The loss of any endangered species, even if it has no 
value today, arguably poses significant future economic harm 
to interstate commerce for future generations by reducing bio-
diversity and eliminating genetic material that could provide 
valuable medical and other benefits.389 Despite the uncertain 
value of species in the future, following Raich's deferential ap-
proach to generalized congressional findings, courts should de-
fer to Congress's reasonable judgment that society and inter-
state commerce will be better off in the future under the ESA's 
policy of protecting all endangered and threatened species in-
stead of only those that have current economic value. 39o Even 
if courts reject this argument, the future benefits argument is 
not essential because the other three arguments-(l) prevent-
ing a race to the bottom among states; (2) preserving biodiver-
sity and ecosystems; and (3) deferring to Congress's compre-
hensive scheme for preserving endangered and threatened 
species due to their present benefits to interstate commerce-
are more than sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the 
ESA as a necessary and proper exercise of the commerce power. 
387. Mank, supra note 5, at 758, 760, 789, 795 (conceding future benefits of en-
dangered species is somewhat speculative). 
388. The traditional econometric approach, weighing market price and tourist 
dollars, will always underestimate the true value of wild species. None has been 
totally assayed for all of the commercial profit, scientific knowledge, and aesthetic 
pleasure it can yield. Furthermore, none exists in the wild all by itself. Every spe-
cies is part of an ecosystem, an expert specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as 
it spreads its influence through the food web. To remove it is to entrain changes in 
other species, raising the population of some, reducing or even extinguishing oth-
ers, risking a downward spiral of the larger assemblage. WILSON, supra note 358, 
at 308; see Kunich, supra note 359, at 1166 (arguing that it is impossible to pre-
dict for certain which species will be valuable in future); Mank, supra note 5, at 
788-89 (same); White, supra note 5, at 246 (same). 
389. Mank, supra note 5, at 788-89. 
390. Mank, supra note 5, at 791-95. 
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4. Deference to Congress's Comprehensive Scheme 
under a Rational Basis Standard 
Since its 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.,391 the Supreme Court has used a rational basis standard 
of review in deciding whether Congress has authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate specific activities.392 In Mor-
rison, the Court stated that there is a presumption that a stat-
ute enacted pursuant to the commerce power is constitu-
tional. 393 Citing Lopez, the Raich Court explained that under 
the rational basis standard of review, in cases involving the 
constitutionality of a statute under the Commerce Clause, the 
Court "need not determine whether respondents' activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate com-
merce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so 
concluding."394 Both the Raich decision and Justice Scalia's 
concurrence recognized that the Court applies the rational ba-
sis standard to the statute and the activities it regulates in the 
aggregate rather than to incidental, intrastate activities that 
fall within its scope.395 In reviewing a comprehensive statutory 
scheme, both the Raich Court and Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion placed the burden on the petitioners to explain why it 
was impermissible for Congress to aggregate noncommercial 
activities with commercially valuable activities as a single 
class.396 
"In enacting the ESA Amendments in 1973, Congress had 
a rational basis for believing that the statute would" protect 
species that substantially affect interstate commerce because of 
391. 310 U.S. 1 (1937). 
392. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,413; Mank, supra note 5, at 736-
37. 
393. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for the 
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a 
congressional enactment upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional bounds."); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 322; Mank, supra 
note 5, at 792. 
394. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995». 
395. Id. at 2208-13; id. at 2216-19 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 
14, at 765-66; Barnett, supra note 22, at 747; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, 
at 494; Parry, supra note 163, at 859-60, 862; supra notes 310-312 and accompa-
nying text. 
396. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra 
note 311 and accompanying text. 
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their direct and indirect economic value to biodiversity, com-
plex ecosystems, and their "irreplaceable genetic heritage."397 
In applying the rational basis standard to assess the statute's 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, courts consider whether it is a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme in determining the amount of 
scrutiny that will be applied to any single component of the 
statute. In Hodel v. Indiana,398 the Court explained that a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme can meet a rational basis 
standard as long as the scheme as a whole is rational "without 
a showing that every single facet of the program is independ-
ently and directly related to a valid congressional goal."399 Ac-
cordingly, the ESA's comprehensive scheme for protecting 
threatened and endangered species is constitutional even if 
some species by themselves lack sufficient economic value. 
Similarly, the Lopez Court acknowledged that Congress 
may regulate intrastate activities that lack substantial com-
mercial value if they are "an essential part of a larger regula-
tion of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could 
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."400 
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence eloquently 
explain that the Court does not require each component of a 
comprehensive statutory scheme to have independent economic 
impacts on interstate commerce and that Congress may regu-
late non-economic, purely intrastate activities as long as they 
are an appropriate part of a valid comprehensive scheme. The 
burden is on a petitioner to demonstrate that Congress's defini-
tion of a class is inappropriate.401 
The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs concluded that Congress has 
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate any endan-
gered or threatened species, no matter how few in number or 
how insignificant in its impact on interstate commerce, because 
the ESA is a comprehensive scheme for preserving endangered 
species that satisfies the substantial effects standard for the 
397. Mank, supra note 5, at 792-93. 
398. 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
399. Id. at 329 n.17; Mank, supra note 5, at 767-68; Mank, supra note 9, at 
947-48; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335; supra note 75 and accompanying 
text. 
400. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Mank, supra note 9, at 
950; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335. 
401. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Clause.402 The Gibbs court determined that applying the com-
prehensive scheme approach to the ESA was appropriate; oth-
erwise, Congress would lack the power to protect the most en-
dangered species simply because "there are too few animals left 
to make a commercial difference."403 Accordingly, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause that examined each endangered species separately 
based on the number of animals at issue would "eviscerate the 
comprehensive federal scheme for conserving endangered spe-
cies and turn congressional judgment on its head."404 
The Fifth Circuit in GDF concluded that the ESA's regula-
tion of all endangered and threatened species was an essential 
component of the ESA's broader regulatory scheme, and, there-
fore, that Congress had the authority under the Commerce 
Clause to aggregate all such species in determining their im-
pact on interstate commerce.405 The GDF decision determined 
that limiting the scope of the ESA to commercially valuable 
threatened and endangered species would thwart Congress's 
goal of protecting the "interdependent web" of whole ecosys-
tems and the complex interrelationships among all species by 
allowing "piecemeal extinctions."406 Additionally, the GDF de-
cision found that "the link between species loss and a substan-
tial commercial effect is not attenuated" because the statute is 
limited to endangered species that would likely be affected by a 
small number of "takes"-killings of individual animals-and 
does not apply to abundant species.407 Furthermore, the GDF 
decision concluded that it was appropriate to aggregate all en-
dangered species because the "ESA's protection of endangered 
species is economic in nature."408 The court reached this deci-
402. Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 497-98 (4th Cir. 2000); Blumm & Kimbrell, 
supra note 10, at 335-36; Mank, supra note 5, at 767-68; Mank, supra note 9, at 
971; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 52. 
403. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498; BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 335-36; 
Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 52. 
404. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498; BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 335-36; 
Mank, supra note 5, at 768. 
405. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003); BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note 
10, at 340; Mank, supra note 9, at 989, 997-98; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 
56-58. 
406. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90, 997-98; Santa-
niello, supra note 268, at 58. 
407. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90, 998; Santaniello, 
supra note 268, at 56-58. 
408. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639. 
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sion in light of the ESA's legislative history referring to the 
'''incalculable value' of the genetic heritage that might be lost 
absent regulation" and because "it is obvious that the majority 
of takes would result from economic activity."409 Accordingly, 
the GDF court concluded that regulating takes of a commer-
cially insignificant Cave Species bat was an essential compo-
nent of the ESA's broader regulatory scheme.410 
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence suggest 
that Congress may, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
regulate commercially insignificant intrastate activities as part 
of a comprehensive statutory scheme that appropriately regu-
lates interstate commerce.411 Under the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts should defer to the 
ESA's comprehensive scheme. Courts should defer to Con-
gress's rational assumption that protecting all threatened and 
endangered species would more likely promote interstate com-
merce by protecting biodiversity and complex ecosystems. Ad-
ditionally, courts should defer to congressional findings con-
cerning the possible future economic benefits of preserving 
these species. Accordingly, following Raich, courts should defer 
to Congress's comprehensive policy for protecting all endan-
gered and threatened species as a rational legislative policy, 
even if Congress cannot prove that every single species would 
have economic value in interstate commerce.412 
409. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93·412, at 4 (1973) ("The value of this genetic 
heritage is, quite literally, incalculable."»; 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(I) (2000) (stating 
that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been 
rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untem-
pered by adequate concern and conservation"); Mank, supra note 9, at 989, 996-
97. 
410. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; Mank, supra note 9, at 997; Santaniello, supra 
note 268, at 56-58. 
411. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-13 (2005); id. at 2216-19 (Scalia, 
J., concurring); supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text. 
412. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 360. 
We think defenders of the take provision should emphasize to the Su-
preme Court the comprehensive scheme rationale which the Court so re-
cently endorsed, stressing the biodiversity protection evident in the 
ESA's ecosystem protection purpose, and the centrality of the take provi-
sion to achieving that purpose. The defenders of the ESA should also ar-
gue that without the ESA's comprehensive scheme, the states would en-
gage in a destructive 'race to the bottom' that would damage biodiversity 
and environmental quality. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion 
allow Congress to regulate some intrastate activities that have 
little economic value if the regulation is part of a comprehen-
sive scheme that appropriately regulates activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.413 They are right to con-
clude that Congress must be able to fashion comprehensive 
statutes to regulate activities that can harm interstate com-
merce and that courts should not invalidate a regulatory 
scheme even though it regulates some intrastate activities that 
standing alone would not justify national regulation.414 This is 
consistent with the letter of Lopez and Morrison, which did not 
address the issue of a comprehensive statutory scheme, and 
would be undercut if Congress was not able to regulate some 
intrastate activities that have little economic value.415 Never-
theless, Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion 
are more consistent with the spirit of Wickard, Darby, Hodel, 
and Wrightwood Dairy than with the narrow economic focus of 
Lopez and Morrison.416 
If it is rational for Congress to preempt state regulation of 
medical marijuana because small amounts could be diverted to 
interstate markets for recreational drug use, it is surely ra-
tional for Congress to enact the ESA to protect all threatened 
and endangered species. There are strong scientific arguments 
that protecting all threatened and endangered species pro-
413. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-20. 
414. Id. at 2216-19. 
415. Pushaw, supra note 35, at 884, 898-909 ("I think it is impossible to de-
termine whether the majority or the dissent correctly applied the Lopez and Mor-
rison standards, because they are so malleable as to justify either result."). 
416. See Adler, supra note 14, at 751-54, 762-77 (arguing Raich effectively 
overruled most of Lopez and Morrison where litigant challenges comprehensive 
scheme statute as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (same). 
But see Pushaw, supra note 35, at 884. 
I think it is impossible to determine whether the majority or the dissent 
correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison standards, because they are so 
malleable as to justify either result. Moreover, as the Justices implement 
these standards prudentially on a case-by-case basis, it is unwise to ex-
trapolate far-reaching implications from any single decision. Just as 
many scholars prematurely heralded Lopez as the beginning of a Com-
merce Clause revolution, others now may be too quick to characterize 
Raich as the end. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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motes biodiversity and protects complex ecosystems that we do 
not fully understand, even if it is not possible to prove that 
every single species is valuable. There is reasonable evidence 
that promoting biodiversity and protecting complex ecosystems 
would more likely promote interstate commerce. Many species 
that do not have direct commercial value still have economic 
value by serving as food for valuable species, pollinating valu-
able flowers, or decomposing waste so that ecosystems stay 
healthy. Furthermore, there is a rational argument as well for 
protecting all threatened and endangered species for their pos-
sible future economic benefits. Under an appropriately defer-
ential rational basis standard, as applied in both Raich and 
Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion, courts should defer 
to congressional findings about the economic value of protect-
ing all threatened and endangered species in a comprehensive 
statutory scheme, even if it is not possible to prove that every 
single species has economic value.417 
The ESA is consistent with the Constitution's federalist 
principles. It only regulates threatened and endangered spe-
cies, not all species. Once a species recovers sufficiently, the 
federal government must return the species to state control. 
The Court has held that states do not own the wildlife within 
their borders, but share concurrent authority with the federal 
government; consistent with the Court's decisions, the ESA 
promotes concurrent federal-state regulation of species. Regu-
lating threatened and endangered species is not a traditional 
state function. Since 1900, the Lacey Act has given the federal 
government a role in their protection; in 1894, Congress cre-
ated Yellowstone National Park to protect endangered bison; in 
1918, Congress regulated migratory birds and other federal 
statutes have protected certain endangered species for dec-
ades.418 Thus, the ESA comports with federalist principles and 
is a necessary and a proper exercise of congressional authority 
under the Commerce CIa use and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
In cases involving a comprehensive statutory scheme, the 
Raich decision signals that the Court will apply a deferential 
rational basis approach in deciding whether Congress may 
regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if such regulation 
417. See supra notes 310-312 and accoinpanying text. 
418. See supra Part V.B. 
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is necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate commerce.419 
Mter Raich, there is a much stronger probability that the 
Court will uphold the constitutionality of the ESA under the 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. 420 Pro-
fessor Blumm and George Kimbrell argue that the Court's de-
nial of certiorari in GDF was directly related to the Court's 
Raich decision. They write: 
The Raich decision's aftershock effect on the ESA was ap-
parently obvious to the Court: The Monday following the fil-
ing of the Raich decision, after holding the GDF Realty cer-
tiorari petition for more than a year (presumably while 
waiting for the Raich opinion), the Court denied certiorari 
in GDF Realty without comment.421 
The appointment of Chief Justice Roberts to replace Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and the appointment of Justice Alito to replace 
Justice O'Connor will not diminish the Raich majority because 
both departing justices were on the dissenting side.422 
419. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005); Adler, supra note 14, at 
751-54, 762-77 (arguing Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and Morrison 
where litigant challenges law as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 
494-98 (discussing Raich's use of comprehensive scheme principle and arguing 
Raich increases probability Supreme Court will find Endangered Species Act con-
stitutional); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 163, at 932-34. 
Barring a major, and unlikely, shift of the Court's composition, we now 
doubt that a robust judicially·enforceable federalism has much future 
left. We are unlikely to see a lower federal court, after Raich, strike 
down an act of Congress on Commerce Clause grounds, or even take the 
more modest step of upholding an as-applied challenge to a federal law. 
[d.; supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
420. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
421. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494; accord ROBERT PERCIVAL ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE & POLICY 898 (5th ed., 2006). 
[d. 
One week after it decided Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court denied 
review in the GDF Realty case, which it had held pending its decision 
concerning federal authority to prohibit cultivation and use of medical 
marijuana. This may indicate that the Court believes that there is no 
constitutional problem with applying the Endangered Species Act to spe-
cies who are so endangered that their destruction would not itself sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce because, like intrastate use of mari-
juana, regulation is necessary to effectuate a broader regulatory scheme. 
422. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 497-98 (arguing Chief Justice Rob-
erts is likely to follow Raich precedent and that Supreme Court will find Endan-
gered Species Act constitutional even if he does not vote in favor of the ESA). 
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While the comprehensive scheme rationale in the Raich 
majority opinion provides a strong rationale for sustaining the 
constitutionality of the comprehensive ESA, whether Justice 
Scalia's concurrence would also sustain the constitutionality of 
the statute raises interesting intellectual questions, although it 
is of less practical significance. Because he is often unsympa-
thetic to environmental issues, it remains to be seen how Jus-
tice Scalia would personally assess the constitutionality of the 
ESA. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon (Sweet Home), the Court upheld the Secretary of 
Interior's broad interpretation of its regulatory authority over 
private landowners.423 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion in 
which he argued that the words "take" and "harm" as used in 
the ESA could not possibly mean "habitat modification"; there-
fore, he argued that the Secretary could not regulate private 
landowners whose activities harm the critical habitat of 
threatened and endangered species.424 Many environmental-
ists perceive Justice Scalia as hostile to environmental is-
sues.425 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia in City of Chicago v. En-
vironmental Defense Fund sided with an environmentalist 
organization because the plain language of the statute was 
consistent with his textualist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion.426 Thus, even if Justice Scalia personally disfavors the 
423. 515 u.S. 687, 707 (1995). 
424. Id. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic 
Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1231, 1265-66 (1996) (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Sweet 
Home). 
425. See, e.g., David R. Rodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone 
Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 456-57 (2000) 
(criticizing Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of standing for environmental 
plaintiffs); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 727-29, 739, 764 (2000) 
(ranking Justice Scalia as the most anti-environmentalist in modern history from 
October Term 1969 until October Term 1998); Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the 
Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. 
L. 809, 827, 847 (2002) (criticizing Justice Scalia's approach to standing issues in 
environmental cases). 
426. 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994); Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City 
of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Un-
ambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 & passim (1995) (discussing 
Justice Scalia's opinion in City of Chicago) (professor Lazarus argued the City of 
Chicago case before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Environmental Defense 
Fund and Newman worked with him on the case); Mank, supra note 424, at 1232-
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ESA, he may rule in favor of its constitutionality in light of his 
Raich concurrence.427 
For all the above reasons, the ESA is constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause. Under Raich's comprehensive scheme 
approach to the Commerce Clause, rational congressional find-
ings about the ecological, biodiversity, medical, recreational, 
genetic, and other benefits of the statute are sufficient to jus-
tify the regulation of all threatened and endangered species, 
even if some have mainly intrastate impacts. To preserve 
these myriad benefits, Congress, under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, may regulate all threatened and endangered 
species because apparently insignificant species can affect 
other species and ecosystems that have clear economic value. 
Further, the statute is not inconsistent with the federalism 
concerns of Lopez and Morrison because protection of endan-
gered species is a concurrent area of federal and state regula-
tion, there is a legitimate congressional concern in preventing a 
race to the bottom among states in preserving these species, 
and the ESA contains a limiting principle as recovered species 
return to state control. 
33, 1257-62, 1290-92 (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion in City of Chicago). 
427. See Adler, supra note 14, at 766-68 (discussing and criticizing Justice 
Scalia's Raich concurrence for too broadly expanding federal power); Claeys, su-
pra note 19, at 815 ("Nevertheless, Raich makes clear that Scalia will side with 
the nationalists in the unlikely event that the Court entertains Commerce Clause 
challenges to other federal schemes that regulate local activities on the pretense 
of guaranteeing certain consequences for interstate trade."). 
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